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PREFACE 
The ma1n purpose ot the thesia 1. to describe and com-
pare the a tti tude ot Duns Scotus and Le1 bn! z toward the tamous on-
tolog1cal argument ot St. Anselm tor the existence ot God. 'l'he 
thesis shows that both Scotus and Leibniz emphasize two main 
points: (1) that the basic 1nsight ot the ontolog1cal argument is 
valid, namely that it i. the prerogative ot the Divine aeing alone 
that He exist, provided only that He be possible; and (2) that the 
possibility ot God means that the Divine Being or Essenee is in 
aome manner conceivable by us without a contradiction; but Scotua, 
claiming that Anselm assumed God's possibility, and Leibn1z, claim 
ing the same ot Descartes, attempt to prove that God i8 possible. 
Scotua' proot. ot the possibility ot God are: first, an analY8is 
at the concept ot Infinite Being; secondly, an appeal to the ex-
perience ot intellect and will which seek the Infinite Good; and 
thirdly, an ~ eosteriori proot of God's possibility from .tricien-
cy. Although this last proot does not enter explicitly into hi. 
re-doing of Anselm's argument, it is not contrary to Scotistic 
principles to combine the ~ pOlteriori proof with the re-doing of 
Anselm's argument. Leibnizts proofs of God'. possibility which 
iii 
iv 
enter into his re-doing of Anselm's argument are: first, an anal-
ysis or the ooncept of Being possessing all simple perfeotions; 
and seoondly, an ~ posteriori proof from oontingency that the 
Necessary Being is possible. In the A Eosteriorl arguments of 
Sootus and Leibnlz for God 'e possibility, we find that they begin 
with th~ -.pprehenslon of being or eesence as real wi thout begin-
ning with existing things as existing. Scotus and Leibnlz, then, 
offer us a complex justitication that we can know the possibility 
of God and that we oan inter Godls existence trom His possibility. 
The ph1loaophioal problems which we discuss in the last chapter 
are: "Can we know the possibility ot God? And if 80, can we ar-
gue trom Hia possibility to Hia actual existence?" 
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The best Manner in which to understand what Scotus 
acoomplishes in his re-doing or the ontological argument of St. 
Anselm ia to exwmine the re-doing in its context. Scotua coloral 
or re-does the ontological argument in the Oxford OOMm!ntar! ~ 
the 3entenoes2 and in his Treltise ~ the First Principle.) We 
will use the Oxford Oommentarx because the re-doing i. eBsentially 
the same in both works and because the Oxford Oomment8.1"1 makes 
more reterences to Anselm. 
In Book I, Distinotion II, Question I, at the Oxford 
OommentarY, acotus asks: -Whether there is among beings something 
existing actually IntinIte,.4 In Question II, he askss ·Whether 
1 OrdiQltI0 JOanni!SDuna Scotl, Opera OmnIa, ed. P. 
Carolo Balic, Vatican City. 19 0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208-209: 
·Per illud poteat colprarl ilIa ratio Anselmi de summo bono 
oogltabI11 •••• M Hereafter referred to as Ordlnat~Q. 
Z Ordlnat!o, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 125-215. 
3 Evan Roche, 'lb& R! Primo Prinolpio .2! ~ ~ 
Bcotu., St. Bonaventure, 1:!., 1949. 
4 Ord!natlg, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 125. My translatIon 
unless otherwi.e indicated. 
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~t is known through its~lt that an infinite being, i.e., God, 
exists?·' 
lbe method ot Scotus is summarized in tive steps: 
~irst, the question is proposed; secondly, arguments against the 
janswer which Seotus will give are proposed, thirdly, in a contl'a, 
~cotus quotes some authorities to support the answer that he will 
~ive; fourthly, he giveR his own answer to the question; and 
~ifthly, he answers the arguments that were proposed in the second 
step. This five-step method of Scotus is applied to the abov~ two 
questions,as follows: first, he gives the first three steps tor 
Ruestion II then he gives the first three steps tor Question II; 
then be proceed .• to give the fourth and fifth steps to Question 
6 II; and tinally be gives the tourth and fifth steps to Question I. 
Jed 'a ExlJterl"~e !! !2!. ISnown 'tbt:ough Itself !!z y.! 
In the treatment ot Question II, in the second step 
wherein objections are proposed, Scotus proposes as an argument 
the opinion ot St. Anselm that the existence ot God is known 
through itself: 
Further, that existence than which nothing greater can be 
thought i8 known through itself; God is of this kind, accord-
ing to Anselm, Pro.logion, ohapter 5; therefore ~d's exist-
5 Ordinatl0, 1, d. 2, q. 2; II, 128. 
6 Ord1natlq, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 131. Scotus answera 
the second question first, because be wishes to dAtermine the way 
ot knowing God's existence before he determines if he oan know 
God'. existenoe. 
.3 
ence 1s known through !tseltl. But that Lthan which nothing 
greater can be though!! 1s not something finite, therefore it 
1s infinite. The major is proven, because the opposite ot thE 
pred1cate is repugnant to the sUbject: tor it it does not 
exist, it would not be that than whioh nothing greater can be 
thought, because if it vere in reality, it would be great,r 
than if it were not in reality but only in the intelleot. 
~ootus has made it clear that An.elmts greatest conceivable object, 
that than which nothIng greater cnn be thought, should be con-
sidered as the infinite being. ~bis is the only text where SCOtu8 
explIcitly makes that identification. In the re-doing ot Anselm'. 
argument J Scotus only implies that the starting point should be 
considered as infinite being. The point of raising Anselm's argu-
~nt here is tha t his argument makes the exis tenoe of God known 
tm-ough Itselt. Por it would be a contradiotion that existence not 
Ibe predicated of that than whioh nothing greater can be thought, 
because then the greatest oonoeivable object would exist only in 
the intellect and hence would not be the greatest conceivable ob-
Ject. For it is greater to exist both in reality and in the intel-
lect than in the intelleot alone. 
Atter Scotus has proposed the first three stepl of both 
Question I and Question II, he prooeeds to ana WEII' Question II 
IWhether the proposition Q.qg. ~s is known through itself. The an-
swer is tha t I 
Therefore this LYropositionl Qgg l,s or ~ essence!! is 
7 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 2; II, 129. 
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known th~ough itself, because those terms are suited to make 
evident the fact ot thei~ combination to anyone who p0rtect1y 
apprehends the terms ot that combina tion, because existence 
is apPaicable to no thing mO~8 perfectly than to this es-
sence. 
Fo~ anyone who perfectly apprehends the divine essence, the propo~ 
sition QQS 11. is known through itself. E~t SEt.!!2.i.!.. However, Soo'!" 
tus immediately adds that no concept whioh we concelve of God can 
~ake the proposition 'tod 1., known through itself for us: 
But It it is asked if existenoe 18 in any concept whioh we 
conceive ot God, so that such a proposition 1s known through 
itself in whioh existence is predioated of such a conoept (tor example, ot such a proposition whose extremes can be 
conceived by us: there can be in our intsllect some concept 
pred1cated ot God whioh is not oommon to God Himselt and to 
c~eaturea, suoh conoepts as the necessary being or the inti~ 
nIta being or the highest good); and lIt it is asked whethey 
ot such a conoept~ oan predioate exlstence in that way in 
which Zthe eoncepll is oonceiv~d Lio that the proposition God 
.1! is known through itselY, I anewer that no such LPropos1-
tlon! is known through itself ••• ~ 
The reason Is, 3cot1l8 continues, that: 
thA concept is not true in itself', unless the parts ot the 
concept are united. And Juet as it is necessary to know in 
~J1dditntive predioations that the parts ot the ooncept are 
able to be united quidditatively, such that one part contains 
the other part torm.ally, so also 1s it neO~8sa~ to~ the 
truth of a proposition which predicates existence tha t we 
should know that the parts ot iss concept ot the subject or 
predlcate are a.otually un! ted. 
On the basis of' theae texts, it i9 clear that tor Sco tua no propo-
sition predicating existence ot God is known through itselt by us 
8 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 138. 
9 Ord1natio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 141-142. 
10 Grdlnatig. 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 141-142. 
from the concepts ot Infinite being, necessary b~lng, or highest 
good, because we do not know that th6 parts of these ooncepts are 
aotually united. We do not know that &ntln&te and be1ng are aotu-
ally united. 
ScotUIJ then eonslders the a.t-~ment ot Axl&elm.. It was 
proposed as an objectIon that that being than which nothing great-
er can be thought is known through i tsel£ .. :Jaotus answez-8 thi& 
objeotion by explaininG that Anselm does not say that such a pz-op. 
osition 1s known t~ough Itselt. ll Sootu8 notes, on the one hand, 
that the proposition, -that being than which nothing greater can 
be thOUght does eXist,· 18 false it it Is held to be known through 
itself; and on the oth~r hand, that such a prop~~itlon 18 true al-
though not known through Itself. 12 Sootus has two reasons fop 
holding that the proposition i8 not known through itselt.l ) FiPet. 
it 18 not e..,1dent through itself that the opposite ot the predi-
cate 1s repugnant to the SUbject. That 18, It 18 not evident 
through 1tselt that nsm-txlstmoe i. x-epugnant to tb.all being than 
which nothing areater .!.!D. ll! thousbt. Secondly, lt i8 not evldent 
througb itself that the parts of the ooncept of the subject are 
actually united. That 18, it i8 not ev1dent througb ltaelf that 
11 OrdiD!tlQ. 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 145. 
12 Ordlnatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2. II, 146. 
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Ithat be1ng and that than wbi,oh nothing sreater oan .2!. t;ho\!&!lt 1 •••• 
(great!a~ co~oeivlb!e) are aotually united. Those are the tvo 
reasons of Scotus tor holding that Anselm's proposition, -that 
being than which nothing greater oan be thought does exist," 1. 
not known through Itselt. 
Since ScotUB has explicitly ldentified Anselm'. greatest 
conceivable object with the notion of infinite being,. we can para-
phrase the two reasons tor holding that Anselm's proposition Is 
not known through itselt. First, it is not evident through 1t~.1~ 
that Don-existlnc! Is repugnant to the not1on ot lot1n1t! beIng. 
Seoon.dly. 1 t 1. not evident through 1 tselt that infinite and pew 
are actually unIted. It Is slgnificant to make thia paraphrase 
because 1n the re-doing of Anselmts argument ScotUI shows that 
those two posit1ons are to be held a8 perluaalvalr proven: first, 
that IDt1elt~ !Dd b.eiSS ~ 9omRoa.ibl e• that 1s, that there i. 
quidditative being in the concept of infinite being, and .econdly. 
that the Int1~tI b,e1,BS 11!!!! Glj1ai, that ls, mua t bave being or 
existence, sinoe it ia a contradict1on to its essence to be caused 
by another. Scotus, therefore, will persuas1vel1 prove the two 
poInts which were asaumed in the objeotion to be ev1dent through 
thems el ve s. 
Sootus bas oompleted hi. answer to Question II. Ue be-
gins his anaver to Question I by conoluding from the prevIous d1s-
cusslon that the existence ot the lnflnlte being 1s not demonstra-
ble '~erau1d with respect to WI» a.lth?U~h from the na turf) o~ 
7 
the terms the proposition the 1.Qtinite beins Iliata is demonstra-
ble RroRter Quld. But the proposItion oan be d.emona trated tor ua 
by a demonstration .9J&1!. from creatures, since from the existence 
ot one relative, such as etteot, we oan tmmediately conclude to 
the existence at its correlative, the cause. SoOtu8 divides hi. 
answer into two articlea* Article I demonstrating the existence 
(e.II.) or the relatiye nroRel't1!1 ot the inf1n1te being !"rom orea-
tures. Article II demonstrating the existence (.ws.) ot the J.D.t1-
!11H. beia tl-Oll the relative propertie. ot the infinite being.14 
~!mon!tratign ~ Gog'l PQI,lb\l&tx ~ Aqty!~lt% ~ Ett191encI 
Article I 1. divided into three partsl firat, a three-
fold conclusion that there 1. aotually among beings some effective 
cause Which is simply first. that there i8 same being which is 
simply firat with re.pcet to finality, and that there i. some be-
ing which i. simpl1 first with respect to eminence, secondly, that 
all three primacies must exist in the same being; and thirdl7, 
that the triple primacy can exist in only one k!,nd of nature.1S 
The tirst part of Article I which proves that there must 
exist the three primacies ot etfioiency. finality, and eminence i. 
divided accordingly into three proofs, each proof having three 
similar steps: for example, 1, Scotl!S starts with the possibl11t,. 
14 Org1.nata1Q, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 148-149. 
lS Ord!n-,10, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 14.9-1$0. 
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of something being effected and arrives at the possibility ot a 
first ettective cause; 2, then he shows that the first possible 
effective oause is totally unoausable, and " tinally he shows 
that the first possible efteotive cause must actually exist.16 
We wish to make two comments on this aspeot ot possibil-
ity. First, we wish to explain why Scotus starts with the possi-
bility ot something being erteoted. Scotus does sO 1n order to 
tulfill bis requirements tor a demonstration. Alan Wolter ex-
plains that there are tour oonditions whioh the conolusion ot a 
demonstration must fultlll.17 First, the o onclus lon must be 0 ... 
tain; oonsequently the premises must be certain. Probable prem-
ises oannot give the certainty require4 in scientitio knowledge; 
probable premlses give only opinion. Seoondly, the conolusion 
must be a n~cessary truth. Thirdly, the conclusion must not be 
immediately -evident but lmown by reason ot other neoessary and 
evident truths. And tourthly, the oonclusion mWlt be oaused b,. 
the premis... It 1s the th1rd cond1tion, that the oonolusion be 
known trom neoessary and evident truths, whioh requires Seotus to 
argue troM the possibility rather than the actualit,. of something 
being etrected. Sootus tells us thatt 
I oould indeed argue that some nature ia produced because 
same subject undergoes a ohange and therefore the term ot the 
16 0rdlna~1Q, 1. d. 2, q. 1-2. II. 151-165. 
17 Alan Wolter, "The 'Theologlsm' ot Duna Scotus." 
Franciscan Studia8 .• VII. 19k7. 265. 
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change oomes into existenoe ~n the subject. and cODa.~uentl~ 
this term or the composite Li.e. the sUbject and ter:!V are 
produced or effected. Henoe by the nature ot the correla-
tivea, some eftioient caua. exists. Formulated in thls rash-
lon, this tirst ar~t would be based upon a oontingent but 
manitest proposition. 
Any conolusion derIved trom the contIngent proposItion that some 
thing is being etfected would not be scientifio knowledge. Scotua 
wanta to start with the truth of a neoess~y proposition. a truth 
whioh o~nnot ohange. Be continues: 
However to pro.e our conclusion the argument can be retormu-
lated 1n such a way that it proceeda trom neoessArY premis.s. 
Thus it is tN. that 80me nature is able to be produced, 
therefore someth1ng i. able to produoe an etrect. The ante-
cedent is proved trom the tact thl t something can be changed. 
tor samething is possible ("po.sible" being def1ned as con-
tra~ to "neces8ary"). In thIs ca.e, the proof tor the first 
conclusion prooeeds tram what the thins ls or trO!9its possi-
ble existence, but not trom ita aotual existence. 
It is not olear 1n Scotusts ahort explanat10n why the premise a-
bout the possibility ot somethIng being efteoted is a neoessary 
truth. Hi. point is that the aotual existenoe of same thing being 
etfeoted is contingent whereas what the thing ls. the possibl1ity 
or essenoe ot the thina. is neoessary_ To show wbJ thi. possibil-
ity 1s neoessary, we can read this text trom the Pr!!I Leetura ot 
Scotua' 
Likewise I Sa1 that although things other than God are aotual. 
ly contingent in respeot ot their actual existence, in r.~ 
.pect ot their possible existenoe they are necessary; .a al-
though that a man exist 1s contingent, it 1s necessary tb~t 
18 Ord~nat12, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 161-162. 
19 Ordlnatl0. 1. d. 2, Ch 1-2; II, 162. 
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he i. possible, because it does not include a contradiction 
to be something; therefore it is neoessary that something 
other than God is posslbl., because being is divided into the 
possible and the necessary, and aa the necessary being has 
necessity, sOZahe possible being haa possibility tram 1ts own 
quiddity. •• . 
It is necessary that a man 1s possible because there i. no contra-
diction in the quiddity ot man. FOr the possible being has it. 
possibility fram its own quiddity. By proceeding tram a premis. 
about the possibility ot so~th1ng being ertected, Scotua starts 
with a necessary premise which w111 give a necessary conclusion: 
the possibility ot something being caused requires the possibility 
ot the first unoausable effioient caus. because ot the impos.1bil-
itl and unintelligibility or an intinitl or essentially ordered 
cau.es~ 21 
In our seoond comment, we wish to examlne the movement 
from the possibilIty or the rirst, uncausable, errectlve cause to 
Ita actual existence. Sootus argues that the flrst, poSSible, 
ettectlve cause must exist ot ltselt since it ls repugnant to the 
nature ot the rirst errectlve to be caused by anotherl 
Proot: Anlthing to who.e natm-e It is repugnant to receive 
existence from something else, exists ot itself it it is able 
to exist at all. To receive existence from something else, 
however, is repugnant to the very notion ot a being which is 
first 1n the order or effic1ency, as is clear from the second 
conclusion Shich shows ~hat th. first possible etteotive 
eaus. MUst be uncausablJl. That it can exist, 18 also clear 
20 Krtm! ~, Ood"Wa. 1449, t.8b, quoted by Wolter, 
"The tTheo10gi~~t~ootus,· Pr,!9clsqan Stud!.!, VII, 371. 
Zl Or4inatlg, 1, 4. ·2, q. 1-2; II, 151-161. 
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tJtom the first concl~s on ,LWhlch shows that the first effec-
tive caUSe is possib e • •• From all this 1t follows that 
an efficient cause vh ch 1s first in an unqualified sense ot 
the term can exist of itself. Oonsequently, it does exist ot 
1tselt, tor what doe. not act~lly exist of 1tself, is in-
capable ot existing of 1tse1t.22 
There are tvo way. that a being may be possiblel either possible-
as-producible or possible-as-existent. Either the quIddlty can be 
caused to ex1st, or the quiddit7 must exist of itselt. Since the 
first P088ible ettective cause mus t be unoausable, its quiddity 
must exist of itself. Por the only way in which its possibility, 
whioh was already proven, oan be not contradioted ia that tbe 
firat possible effective cause ex1st ot itself. We sball see lat-
er that Sootua will reter to this movement from possibility to 
aotuality vben be re-does the ontological argument. 
The second part ot Article I proves that the first ettec 
tive cause must also be the first tinal cause and the supreme na-
ture.2) Then the third part of Article I proves that there can be 
only one kind of nature to which the triple primaoy of efficiency. 
finality. and eminenoe is applicable. 24 Later in Book I, Distino-
tion 2, Question 3, ScotU8 shows that there can be numerically 
only one being which possesses the specific nature ot the triple 
22 Ord1natlQ, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 164 .. 16$. 
23 2tdinatlo, 1, d.-2, q. 1-2; II, 169-171. 
24 0r4Inat19, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 171-173. 
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pr1mao,..25 
Thl ~oqt.l .it lnr1B1 tt 
In Article II, Scotua proposes to show that the one na-
ture posaessing the triple primac,. is the intln1 t. being. He be-
gins by showing that the first efticient has intellect and will, 
that hi. understanding i8 his essence, and that hi. esaenoe i. 
representatiYe ot an infinite number ot Objeot •• 26 He tben oon-
c1udes with tour arguments that the fIrst being is infinite: a) 
trom the fact that the first being 1s the first ettioient cause ot 
all other things, b) trom the taot that the first being has knowl-
edge ot an infinite number of things, 0) from the fact that the 
firs t being is the ultimate end, and d) hom the fact that the 
first being is the supreme nature. 27 
We vi11 now _ke a close examination of the third and 
fourth proofs ot intini t'1 because it 1s in their oontext that Soo-
tua r8-d08. the ontological argument of Anselm. 
Sootus otters this short proof tor the infinity of the 
first being fram finalit,.: 
Our will can alwa"s loye and seek something greater than an,. 
finite being, even as OUP intellect 1s alwa,.. able to know 
more. And, what is more, there .eem. to be III natUl'al incli-
nation to love an infinite good to the greateat degree pos.!. 
2> 0,.dinat12, 1, d. 2, q. .3; II, 222-244. 
26 Qrd,lnatlsb 1, d. 2, ct. 1-2J II, 174. 
Z1 QriinatiSb 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 189. 
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ble, because the free wIll ot itselt and wl thout the aid ot 
any habIt promptly and delightfully loves this good. Indeed 
It 8eems that the wIll 18 not pertectly sati8fled w1~b any-
thing e18e. And it 8uch an Infinito good were really opposed 
to the natural objeot ot the will, ~hy is it that the will 
does not naturally hate an inf'lnlte good, just as It natural-
ly hates non-existenoeL according to AugustIne in De l!bero 
arb11i12. III, y111' For it seems that it 1I1ntlnite" and 
Igoo were incompatlble, then there would be no way in which 
the will could be satlsf1ed .in such a good, nOr could it 
readl1y tend towards anythIng which Is oppose. to It. proper 
Ob.'.1t.ct. 'I'lll. argument 11111 be contirmed. in the tollowing by 
a islmil8£! 8.l'gument from the 1ntellect.26 
Since Scotua treats the argument trom the !ntellect as a p .... ua-
sly. p1"oot,29 it appears that the argument btom the will ls also a 
persuasive proof. Por the ugumentl btom the intellect and the 
wl11 are siml1ar in assumIng compatlbl1ity 8ince incompatibility 
18 not apparent. 
The purpose ot thIs argument is to show that "InfInity" 
i. not incompatible with -800d.o It °intlnlty· and "good" were 
1ncompatible, -lnfin1te good" would be equivalent to non-existence 
and so would be hated. by the will. Por, as August~ne points out, 
the w111 naturally hates non-existence. Since, however, the wl11 
actually strives tor infInite good (because It does not rest in 
anl finite good), "Infinite" and °good" cannot be incompatible • 
. Next, In arguing trom the tact that the supre.e nature 
1s most perfect, Scotua use ... ·analy.l. of concepti to establlsh 
&d •• 
28 Ordlnatl0, 1. d. 2 .. q. 1-2; II, 205-206,. tpans. 
Allan Wolter, ~ 8cotwil Phl10£toRhlcal Wt-I t&ns!h London, 1962, 
70-71. The word similar" is not in the LatIn text. 
29 Ordlnatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2J II, 207. 
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the possibility of infinite beingt 
That to whioh intensive infinity i8 not repugnant 18 not all 
perfeot unless 1t be 1nfinite, for to be infinite ia compat-
ible with it. And if it i. f1nite, it can be exoeeded or 
excelled. Now infinity is not repugnant to being, therefore 
the moat perfect betos 1s infinite. The minor ot this proof 
• • • cannot, it seems, be proven ... prior1. POI" JUI t as con-
tradiotoriesbytheir very nature contradict each other and 
their opposition oannot be made manifest by a~thing more ev-
ident, so also these terms, viz. ftbeing" and "infiniteft by 
their very nature are not repugnant to each other. Neither 
does there seem to be any ~1 ot proving this ,except byex-
plaining the meaning of the notions themselves. ".Being" Can-
not be explained by anything better than itself. "Infinite-
we understand by meana of finite. I explain "infiniteft in a 
popular definitIon as tollows: The infinite ia that Which 
exce.ds the finite, not exactly by reason ot any f1nite m'as. 
ure, but in exc.ss ot any measure that coUld be assigned.J 
The argument 1s that the eminent beins ia that which cannot be ex-
celled. Now if the most perteot be1ng were finite, then the moat 
pertect being could be exoel1ed 1t and only if infinity were com-
posaible with being. But the most pertect being is that which 
oannot be exoelled. 'rberetore the most perteot being ia not fi-
nite but infinite, it intinity and being are oompos,ible. The 
orucial point ot the argument is the question whether infinity and 
being are oompossible. lbe compatibility ot notes 1n tbea. two 
concepts would mean that the thing oonoeived i8 possible. 
Scotu8 noted that it oannot be demonstrated A 21"12£1 
that infinity is compos sIble with being. Bettoni otters an ex-
30 Ordinat+p, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 206-207, trana. 
Wolter. Dun. Sooius, 1-72. 
1$ 
planatlon:)l We demonstrate a truth A prlor~ when we attain the 
truth by a slmple explanation ot the meanlng ot the terms in-
volved. In the almple explanation ot the term. -being" and Rin_ 
tlniteR we oannot judge that there is a necessary conneotion be-
tween the terms. Thus we oannot judge .. .nr!or1 tba t an intini te 
being is possible. ~ut at least our analysis of the terms ahowa 
that there i. no apparent contradiction in the notion ot an Inti-
nite being. 
Sootua next tries to show that there oan be no contra-
diction in the notion ot an intinite being: 
The following persuasive argument oan be given tar what 
we intend to prove. Just a. evel'7th1ng i. assumed to be po. 
aible, it 1ta impossibility 1. not apparent, 80 also all 
things are assumed to be compo,sible, it their non-compos.1-
bilit~ 1. not manitest. Now there i. no non-compos.ib11ity 
apparent here, tor 1t is not ot the nature ot being to be 
tinite, nor does tinite appear to be an attribute ooextens1v 
with being. But it they were mutually repugnant, 1t would b 
tor one ot thes. reasons. The ooextensive attribute. which 
being po.s •• ses aeem to be sufficiently evident. 32 
It 1s important to note that this argument ia only called persua-
aive. Scotus is arguins that Just as a thing i8 assumed to be 
possible if its impossibility is not apparent, so thoa. things ar 
assumed to be oompo.sible it their non-oompo8sibllity 18 not ap-
parent. Although thi8 i8 an aS8umption, Scotu. believea that it 
is not unreasonable. 
31 Etfram Bettoni, ~IBScotu81 fb! Baaic Principles 0 ~i~ Pbt*g'ODhJ. trans. and ed. • onansea, 6.P.A., Waahington, 
•• , 9 1,1 b. 
2 d 1 d. 2 II 
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SootUI notes that there are two cases whlch would show 
non-composslbi11 ty between Intini ty and being. '.I'be tirst cas. is 
that the nature ot being might always have to be conceived as tl-
nite. Scotus rejects this a1ternatlve because or hls unlvocal 
notlon ot being. For Scotus, belng i8 the proper object of the 
human intellect; just a. man may abstract the concept of being 
from the senslble aocidents and b1 this ooncept have a conoept ot 
substance as being, 10 man ma, abstract the concept ot being trom 
finlte being and thus have a ooncept ot being which max be appli-
cable to an infinite being.)3 Univooit,. of being is an abstpao-
tion tor Scotua. Univooit1 ot being in no way prevents that there 
be different m04es of being, among which one is infinite and man, 
are flnlte • .34 
The .econd case whloh would show non-compossibility be-
tween infintty and being would be that flniteness might be an at-
3) Sootua, OommentS;ia Oxonien.i. ad IV. Librol ~­
trl S,ntentlaPy)' ed. P.M.P.rcia, 6.'.R., ?forenoe 191 ,-x;--
d. ), q. ); I, )8-339. Hereatter reterred to as ~. Oxon •• 
~ Alan Wolter, O.P.M., The 1~an!0endentall And 1~1~ 
Punotion In~ Metaahlaloa ot ~~otus, It. SOnaventure, ._, 19Ub, 4S'--WSCOtus, in short;-aaw no contradiction in admittin& 
that the term 'belng' can be predicated elther equlvoca11y (ana1a-
gousl,.) o~ univocall, dependlng upon whether it signitie. all 
thIngs properlI or not. In the tlrst instance, it signlfies the 
Intrinsic mod. as well a. the co~on r,t10 of being and hence bas &1 many oorrespondi~ Pioper conoepts as there are intrinsicallY d trerent c~as~e. or-be nga. ~n the second nstanci, t sIgn riel 
thlng. only impertect1y, s1noe the mind abstraot. from the proper 
intrlnsic mode.. But In this case we have not several concepts, 
but one univocal common concept. n 
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tribute coextensive with being. But the only attributes coexten-
sive with being are: one, true, and good, whereas the attribute 
tinite-intinii! is a disjunctive attribute ot being. Scotus ar-
gues: 
In the disjunctive attributes, however, vhile the entire dis junction cannot be demonstrated troM "being", nevertheless a 
a universal rule by positing the less pertect extreme ot • 
being we can conclude that the more pertect extreme is real-
lsed in some other beinr. Thus it tollows that it 80me bei 
i8 finite, then aome be ng i8 intinite. And it some being i 
contingent, then some being i8 neoessary. Por 1n 8uch case. 
it is not possible tor the more impertect extreme ot the dis 
JURation to be existentially predioated ot "being", partiou-
larly taken, unles8 the more pertect extreme be exiltentia11 
veritled ot 80me other being upon which it depends.J5 
Alan Wolter points out that this ·universal rule· describes what 
may be concluded, not imaediately interred. 36 That i., from the 
finite one may conclude by a reasoning process to the infinite. 
There is no ex professo analysis ot this "universal rule" by Soo-
tua. We may suppos. that this "uniyersal rule" is obvious in .0. 
disjunctive attributes, for example, caused-caus., and i. probabl 
extended by Sootus to include finite-infinite. we may also sup-
pos., as Wolter points out, that Scotus's analysis of the tBplica 
tiona ot an essential order shows that where an essential order 
ex1sts, one member in a disjunotive attribute must tollow in our 
from the other member of th~ diSjunction. 37 
35 .22. Oxon., 1, d. 39, q. 1; 1,1214., Wolter, Duns 
Scotus, 8. 
36 Wolter, The Transcendental~. 137. 
Wolter 
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Sinoe Sootua has rejected the two cases whioh would show 
non-compo •• ibility between infinity and being, he assumes that in-
finite being i8 possible. 
Scotus otters two more arguments persuasive ot the oom-
possibility ot infinity and being: 
Another perauasive argument adduoed is this. Int1nity 
in its own vay, is not opposed to quant1ty (that is, where 
parts are taken suooessively); theretore, nel~her 1s infini-
ty, In its own way, opposed to entity (that is, where perteo-
tion exists simultaneously). 
Again, 1t the quantity oharacteristic ot power is simpl, 
mars pe~feot than that obar~cter1st1c ot_~.a, Wh~iS it .~~.­
sible to bave an infinity ~ot small part!! in an Lext~nd.!V 
mass and not an infinite power' And if an int1nite power is 
possible, then it actually exists, .s is evident from the 
third conclusion about the first etf10ient cause, and will 
also be proved again later.)6 
The two arguments are essentially this: an indioation ot intini-
ty is found in quantity where parts are potentially divisible in-
to infinity_ If infinity is possible on the Ie •• perteot 1e .. l 01 
quantity. then infinity ought to be possible on the more perfect 
levels ot being and power, that is, being and effioient oausality_ 
Soot us believes that it i. possible to have intinite or eternal 
movement, an endless motion, and that it is possible to have in-
tlnlte etreots, that Is, an endless number or etrects sucoes.ive-
11.39 Now it elther infinity is possible, then the power which il 
able to produce such intinlty in quantity successively must be it. 
)8 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208, trans. Wo1t.~, 
Duns Scotul. 7~. 
39 Or-dina tl0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, .190-194_ 
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selt int'ini tee Now auoh an interenoe delignates the power 8.8 in-
tinite by extrinsio denom.ination trom the etrects. And Scotul 
apparently bas no problem arguing that tbat whioh is infinite by 
extrinsio denomination is infinite in its being. Be argue.: 
It the First Being at one and the aame time tormall! pos-
sea8ed all oausal power, • • • it would be infInIte, becaus • 
• • • it has power to produce an infinite number all at onoe, 
and the more one oan produce simultaneousl,.., tbe greater the 
power in intensity. But it the Pirst Being posseaaet ausb 
power in an even more pertect way than if it had it formally, 
• • • its intensive infinity tollow8 A tortior~. But the 
tull causal power that eacb thing may bave in itself, the 
IPir!"t Being posseases even mON pertectly than it it were 
tormally present. 
We oan establish naturally the existenoe of' an infi-
nite power which on its part possesses s~ultaneously tbe 
tullneaa of caulality and could produce an infinite number 0 
things a t e~c., it only they were capable of exis tins s1mul-
taneoualy.'+U 
Sinoe the tirst efficient caUSe baa its power independently, it 
haa the totality of 1ts eftect 1n its power at ()De and the a ... 
t1me. And because it has the power otproducing an infinite n~ 
bel' ot ettecta at the same time (it thes. things were capable ot 
existing simultaneously), the first eff1cient cause i. int1n1te 
In It.elf, tbat ls, intensi.ely.41 
It wou14 help our understanding to oontrast tba ata1"t-
ing point of the tlrst argument tor the po8s1blllty and existence 
ot the First Being with the starting point of the last argument 0 
40 Ordinatio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 193-194, trans. Vol 
ter, ~ Scotul, 1~. 
41 Ord1natio, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 190. 
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Scotus. In the argumen~8 tor the Pirst Being, Scotus starts with 
the reality ot essenc •• which is known trom existent changeable 
beings. Seotus does not work with exlstence in the beglnning at 
hls premiaes but with the reality at eSSeBce which may very well 
exist but which need not be considered aa exIsting. The argument 
trom the reality at essenee which Is known trom changeable beings 
are oonsidered by :Jcotus to be true demonatra tions. But the ar-
gument we haYe jus t seen is conaidered by Scotua to be onl,. a per 
suasion. Par its starting point 1s the AsaymRtiop that it infin-
ity is posslble on the l.pertect leyel of quantity, then In.tlnitJ' 
ought to be poa.ible on the more pertect leyel ot belng and etti-
cient causality. 
In the next text, Jaotus oonttnue. hi. analy.is ot the 
concept ot int1nlte be1ng and also note. that the intellect eyen 
delights 1n trying to know an infinite beingl 
Again. why is It that the intellect, whos. obJeot is be 
ing, does not tlnd the notion at something intln\te repug-
nant? Instead ot this, the infinite aeems to be the most 
perteot thing we can know. Now it tonal discord so readily 
dlspleases the ear-, it would be strange it some intellect 41 
not clearly percelve the contradiction between intinite and 
Its first object (yiz. being) it such existed. Por it the 
d1sagreeable becomes ottensive aa 800n aa 1t 1. peroeived, 
why is it that no intellect naturally shr1nks t1"Om the inti-
nltely intelligible a8 it would trom something out pt r..a~o­
n1. with, and even de.tructive ot, ita f1rst obJect.4Z 
Scotus makes a compar1son between a .ensory faculty and the intel 
42 Ord1nat10, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208, trana. Wolter, 
»un. Sootum, 72-73. 
- ......................... 
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lectual taculty. If being and inflnlte were contradiotory, the 
notion ot infin1te being should be as disagreeable to the intel-
lect as a discordant sound. is to the eo-. But the notion ot In-
f1nite being 1s not d1sagreeable to the intellect. Rather, it 
seems to be the most pertect thing we can know. 'I'herefore, beine 
and infinite are not oontradictory_ 
We have seen many arguments trying to prove tbeooJllpoa. 
sibI11ty ot Infinlty and. being,. Betore these arguments, Sootua 
baa already shown that the being with the triple primaoy in .ttl-
cien01. tinality, and eminence, exists. Because thls being muat 
be the most pertect, it must have all possible perfections whi'oh 
would be betitting to its nature. If lnfinity and being are oom-
patlbl., then the IROst perteot being must ba .... the pertectlon ot 
lnfinity. This is why Sootua bas introduced many arguments tryi 
to pro .... the compatib1lity ot Infinlty and b.lng. POl" Scotua. th 
proots ot oompatibl1ity do not assume that we bave a proper oon-
oept ot the intinite being, aince he baa defined inflnity in a 
negati .... anner: "The infinite is that which exoeed. tt. tinIte, 
not exaotly by reason ot any finite measure, but in exoe88 ot an,. 
meaaure that could be assigned. "43 Since Intln1ty is known In a 
negative way, and since being i8 a concept abstraoted trom finite 
beinga, tne compossibility ot infinity and being would represent 
43 OrdinatI0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2J II, 207, tran8. Wolter, 
l2!a!. Scotu., 7~. 
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what is possIble, even though the compossibility is not a proper 
concept. 
!S! He-doing ~ Anselm's Argument 
Immediately after this persuasive argument that the in-
tellect can disoern no contradiction in the notion of an infinite 
beins, Scotus continues: "In this same way Ana elm' s argument in 
the Pro,losion about the b1ghest oonceivable good can be tOUChed 
up. w44 Our interpretation ot the words, .. in this 8ame Yay".. is 
that Saotus will emphasize that the starting pOlnt ot Anselm',. al" 
gument should be interpreted as the concept ot infinite being 11'1 
which the intelleotcan discern no contradiction. And. since Sco-
tus malntained that the argumenttrom the intellect's delight in 
the notion of an intinite being 1s a oonfirmation ot the str1vina 
ot the will to possess an infinite good, we can interpret Scotua 
to be connecting both of the prIor arguments trom the will and tb 
intellect with his re-doing of Anselm's argument. 
!h! Possibility ~ ~ 
Scotus doe. think that that than which nothing greater 
can be thought Is the infInite being, sinoe he said 80 explicitly 
in Book I, distinotion II, questIon 11.45 And In the very 1'8-40-
44 Ordinatl0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 208-209, trans. 
Wolter, ~ Scotu •• 1j. 
theals. 
45 Or41natl~, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 128. Se. page) ot 
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ing ot Anselm's atarting point, Sootus is seen to be substituting 
the concept ot infinite being tor Anselm's greatest conceivable 
object and to be emphasizing that the concept is without contra-
dictions 
Hi. ['l.nsel1ll.'i/ de8cJJiption must be understood in this way_ 
God is a being conceived without oontradiotion, who 1s so 
great that it would be a contradiction it a greateJJ being 
could be oonceived. That the phrase ·without oontradiction-
must be a4ded is clear, tor an,-thing, the "IeJJY knowledge or 
thought ot which include. a contradiction, i. called "incon-
ceivable-, tor it Includes two oonceivable notions 80 oppose 
to eac.h other that they cannot in any way be rused into a 
lingle conceivable object. aince neither determines the oth-
er. 
It tollows then, that the greatest object conceivable 
without oontradiotion can actually exist in reality. Th1s 1 
proved tirst ot its essential being, tar 1n suoh aft object 
the intellect 1s tully satist1.~; Ylz. "being", 11 veritied 
and thi. in the highest degree.4b 
We interpret that the last paragraph is arguing that 
there i. no contradiction in the starting point, the notion ot an 
intinite being. Pol' 1n the greatest conceivable object, we dis-
cover the primary object at the intellect, being, and in 1ts higb 
est degree. We understand Sootus to mean intinite being by tbe 
vorda, -being and this in the blghest degree," on the basia ot 
another passase where he shaWl U8 the bette~ meaning that he wish 
.a to give to the concept. "highest being." This passage occurs 
arter Scotus has tully proven the existenoe of one infinIte being 
in the disouuion of the question whether man i. able to have nat 
46 Ordinatio, 1. d. 2, q. 1-2, II, 209-210, trans. 
Wolter, Dun. Sc~tu •• '3. 
ural knowledge ot God. Be writesa 
But it you say that "higheat good" or "Higheat Being" 
expresses an intrinsic mode ot being and includes other oon-
cepts virtually. I reply that it "higheat" be taken in a 
comparative sense, then it 1noludes a relation to 80mething 
extrinlic to tn. being, whereas "infinite" is an abaolute 
ooncept. But it -highest-il understood in an absolute 
.enae, i.e., aa meaning that the ver1 nature of the thing is 
such that it oannot be exe~ded, then this pertection ls oon 
oelved even more expressly In the notion of an infinite be-
ing, beoause "highest good" does not Indioate as such wheth-
er it Is infinite or tlnite.41 
Thus the better meaning that can be given to the word -highest" 
is "infinite," in whioh there is no relation to somethlng extrln-
s10 to the intinite being. It "highest" were taken in a compara-
tive sense, then we would not know whether the highest be1ng 1s , 
infinite or tinite. And it' the highest being were only .tinite, 
then the replaolng of Ana.1m'. startlng point with the conoept ot' 
the highest finite being would not make sense in thia oontext 
where the notion ot an intinite being i, being discuased. 
The non-oontradiction ot the notion ot infinlte being i 
stressed b,. Sootua. If infinite and being wepe contradlctor,. to 
one another, they would not torm a un1fied concept. But aa Sootu 
argues, the ooncepta do toPa a unttled concept, namelYJ 
the concept ot' an infinite he1nl_ For this ls almpler than 
the conoept ot "good beIng" or true being" or other s1mIlar 
ooncepts, sinoe infinite is not a quasi attribute or proper-
ty ot "beIng" or of that ot whioh it ls predioated. Rather 
it signlfies an intrinsIc mode or that entltY', so that when 
47 Ordlnat10, 1, d. ), q. 1-2; III, 41, trans. Wolter, 
Duns Scotua, 21-28. 
I aa1 "Infin1te Being", I do not have a ooncept oomposed ac-
oldentall1, aa 1t were, ot a sUbJeot and its attribute. 
What I do bave la a concept of what is easential11 one, name 
1,. ot a subject wi th III oerta1n grade ot perfection -- int1n1 
t1- It la lIke "Intense whltenesa," whIch i8.not a not10n 
that i8 aocidentally compo8"d, such as ·visible whitenes." 
would be, tor the intenalt1 is an Intr1nsic grade ot white-
ne •• lt.elt. Thus.the simp110ity of thla oonoept "Infln1te 
Being" 119 evldent.46 
Although a tormal note i8 added to being when inf1nite la predi-
cated of being, we do not have a conoept composed aooldentall" 
a. it were, ot a subJeot and It. attrIbute. aather we have a COD 
oept whioh Is es.entially one, a subject with a oertain degr •• or 
mode ot perfeotion, Infin1t1. 
We have seen the proof ot Sootus that the oonoept, In-
1'init. being, does not tOl"m a oontra<110t:l.oo and that th ..... 1'oN 
the conoept bas e •• entlal beIne, e •• e gu1ddl!l1tl'{URlt,49 SInce 
that proot 1. .lmilar to the proof. trom the intellect and will 
to.,. the compatlbll1t, ot infinIte and beIng, It appears that Sco-
tua holds his 1"e-dolog 01" Anaelm. s argument to be on11 a persua-
sIve argument. POI' ScotU8 noted that the argument trom the in-
tellect '. anal,.s1. of the conoepts, infinite and bel~. vas onl1 
a persuasive p~oot. We should note once agaIn tbat thele p~oot. 
ot co.patibilit,. do not a •• ume th"t ve haw a proper oonoept ot 
ot the infinite being. 1fh8 OCRpatibi11t,. ot Inflnlt,. and be1ns 
48 Ordinatio, 1, d. j, q. 1-2; III, 40, t~n8. Wolter, 
Dun! S,9ot'q!, Z'I. 
49 Wolter bas tranalated ~ guldditativum aa e ••• n-
tial beIng. 
would represent what is possible even though the oompatibility is 
not a proper conoept. 
The Aotual,itt .2!: ~ 
We oan continue the a.nal,.si. ot the argUl'l.lent. Now that 
the esse guidditativwm of the infinite being has been persuasivel,. 
shown, it remaina to show that the infinite being must haTe aotual 
existenoe, ~!!e existenti!e: 
It 1s further argued, then, that this being aotuall,. 
exist. becaus. the highest oonceivable object is not one 
which i. merel,. in the intelleot ot the thinker, tor then it 
both could exist, because a. something po.sible it i. con-
oeivable, and yet could not eXist, beoau.. the id.a ot exi.t-
ing in virtue ot some cause is repugnant to ita TefT natUzt •• 
This latter was shown above in the seoond oonolusion ot the 
proot tram etticienor. Theretore, what exists in reality i. 
conoeivably greater than what exist, onlr in the intellect. 
This is not to be Wlderstood, howeve.r, in the senae that 
.omething oonoeived it it actually exists, is by tact ot 
existing, conceivable to any greater extent. The meaning is 
that whateTer Mists is greater than wl».tev.r is solely in 
the inte11ect.>O 
Th. reality of the essence or ess, guidditatl!y! ot infinite being 
has already been shown. It the essence were only in the intellect 
ot a person conceiving ita possibility, then the only way that the 
essenoe could exi. t, it it did not alpeady exis't at ,it.elt by 
nece.sity, would be that the essence were caused to exist. But 
it is oontradictory to the notion or infInite being, the greatest 
conceivable objeot, that it have the imperfection at being caused. 
= 
So OrdinatI0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2f II, 210, trans. Wolter, 
~ Scotua, 7J-1~. lote that Wolter has translated e8s~ existen-
~ as actual existence. 
Therefore the essence cannot be only in the understand1ng but must 
exist or 1taelf in order to preserve the status ot the essence ot 
infinite belng as a true possible. Scotus notes flnally that what 
exists in reali~ isaonoeivabl¥ greate~ ~han what exists only in 
the intelleot. He says that this means n,ot tha y the thing i8 con-
ce1ved to a greater extent 1f it exists, but that a possible whioh 
exists is greater than anything wMoh 1s onl1 in the int elleot. 
By this re-doing, Sootus baa persuasively proven the two 
points whioh were assumed in the objeotion (whicb al.lll1Marized An-
a.1m's U' guaent) to be evident twough the .. el vea. The two point. 
assumed to be evident through the..elves yere. first, that in-
finite and ,being were oompossible, and· seoondly, that the 1ntinite 
being must exist. Infinite and being are compo.sible,. that is" 
their notes have a quidditative reality si~.e there i. no contra-
dict10n in the concept of infinite be1ng, and ,ince the will and 
I 
intelleot strive to attain the infin1te good ~ truth. The in-
finite being must exist, that is, must bave existent1al reality 
.1nce it 1s a contradiction to ita essenae to be oaused by anothen 
Sootus otre~. anotbep pe-doing of Anselm's argument. 
Or the argument could be retouOhed in this :'7- What-
eyep exists is conceivable to a greater extent .l.than what 
does not exl.jJ, that is to say. it oan be known more ~rf'eot. 
17. becau.e it 1s intuit1ve17 intelligible or v1sible •. What 
doe. not exist e1ther 1n i~.e1t or In something more noble to 
whioh it adds nothing, is not capa")le or b.108 intuited. Now 
what oan be seen 1s able to be known more perteotly than what 
cannot be intuited, but known ~nly ab8t~activel1. Thererore, 
28 
the most perfect thing that oan be known exists.51 
This argument presupposes tram the previous re-doing that ScotuB 
has ~stabllshed the essential being, the esse gulddltat&vum, ot 
the infinite being a8 the most perfect thing that oan be known. 
Now in this argument, Scotus analyzes what would necessarily be 
predicated ot this essential being. Now the essentIal being of 
infinite being implIes that the best perfeotion of knowability be 
attributed to its essential being. But the most perfect way ot 
being known is intuitive knowledge. Por intuition ls knowledge ot 
presence, that 18, knowled88 of exlstenoe. Therefore, the essen-
tial being of infinite being must have actual existence, esse~­
~stentiae. Por it the infinite being did not aotually exist, it 
would not be able to be intuited; and then its non-existenoe would 
oontradict ita essential realitJ whioh ought to be able to be in-
tuited. But we cannot contradict the essential being. Therefore, 
the infinite beIng DlUI t exist. 
!b! ~ Perfections 
We have $een two re-doings ot Anselm's argument tor the 
existence ot God. In the first re-doing, Sootus bas plaoed the 
emphasis on showing the compatibility between infinity and beIng. 
$1 Ordinatl0, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2: II, 210.211, tran.. Wol-
ter, ~I. Sootuf' ?li. See S. Day, O.P.H., Intuiti\te arw=tiO!U A ~ to-tbe-Slgn tlcance gt the Later Scholastlpt, St.onaventure, 
T.-Y.;l~, 101-1041 :Jaotus requil"es bOth presence and the exist-
ence of the object tor pertect intuit1 .. oognition. 
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By showing Scotus t • emphasis on the fact that the pure perteotions 
are compatible, we will better understand his re-dolnga of the ar-
gument of Anselm. 
In deflning a pure or .imple perfectlon, Sootus start. 
with Anaelm's descriptlon' "Perfection 1n the unqualified .enae 
ot the term 1s one whloh, in anything having It, it 1s better to 
have than not to have."52 Elsewhere, Scotus define.. "That 1. 
said to be a pure pertection whioh Is better in el'e:rythlna than 
that whioh i. not-it. "S3 1'h1. definition is qualltied by Sootua 
In two plaoes. Pirs t, the phrase, "than tna t whlch is not-it," i. 
to be understood .. "than aD1thing po.ltlve Which 1. inoompatible 
wlth it. "54 Allan Wolter explain .• that, although bwlan natllr'e 18 
better than a atone (a non-human nature), stll1 hutnan nature Is a 
11ml ted pertec tlon, not a pure perfeotlon, aince human nature la 
not better than angell0 nature whlch 1. po.i t1vel;y incompatible 
with it. But Inteillgenoe 1. a pure perteotion ainoe It 18 better 
than amy thing poaitlvely inoompatible with it. Por the Intelli-
gent is alway. better than what i. not intellig~t.SS Seoondly, 
$3 Roobe, 12! blmo PrInolp10, 77 • 
.$4 ay., 79. 
S$ Wolter, Tbe trlnaoegd,ntala, 164. 
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a pure pertection is not better in every thing. 56 POI' example, 
intelligenoe in a dog is not better than non-intelligence in a 
dog beoause intelligenoe i8 incompatible with the nature ota dQg. 
Brietly, a pure p~rtectlon may be detined as "that which 1. abso-
lutely and in an unqualified .ense better than everything incom-
patIble with it.-S7 
Allan Wolter notes that Sootus gives speoial attention 
to tour properties of the pupe pertectionsl (1) all pure perteo-
tions are mutually oompatible, (2) all pure perfeotlons are com-
patible with infinity, () pure perteotions are communicable; and 
(~) pure pertection. are irreducibly simple.Sa 
(1) All pure perteotions are mutually compatible. Wol-
ter 8U_81"i&.8 the argument ot Scotuel Let US designate by A and 
B two pure perteotions whioh are mutua.1ly i:n.col'1Jj')atible. How sinoe 
a pure perteotion i. that whioh i8 simply and absolutel,. better 
than anything inoompatible with it, A as a pure perfeotion must be 
better than B whioh i. incompatible with A. But 1n like manner, 
B as a pure perfeotion wl11 be better than A which 1. incompatIble 
with B. But suoh mutually oontradiotory propositions oannot be 
true. It they were t~u.. then any given pure pertectlon could be 
both better and not better than another pure perfection. Since 
$6 Roolle, ~ }triao lTlrnciRl0. 79. 
$7 ~. 
sa Wolter • .fbI. TPa"'·" ....... dentala .. 166-167. 
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that contradiotion in the notion ot a pure pertection follows ~om 
holding that pure perteotions are inoompatible, we must hold that 
every pure pertection mUlt be oompatibltt with every other pUN 
pertection. This consequence preserves the detinition of a pure 
pertection.59 
(2) Every pure perteotlon i8 oompatlble with intinity. 
Wolter notes that this presupposes two propositlons: first, that 
infinity is a positive ~tection or mode ot being, wad seoondly. 
that nothing exceeds that which i8 intinite. Now if a pure per-
teotion were inoompatible wi tb IntlnitJ', it would be bette,.. than 
infinity. POl" a pure pertection i. better than anythlng inoom-
patible with it. But 81noe nothing exoee48 the infinite, a pure 
perteotion cannot exoeed the infinite and tberet~e mus t be oom-
patible wlth Intlnity.60 SootUI here i& able to otter another 
definition 01" a pure perfeotion as "that whioh oan exist unlim-
ited in something. "61 Thus Wolter explains that a pUN perfeotion 
ca.n be desoraibed as that who.e tort1tll notion oontains no impex-tec-
tion ox- li~tatlon.62 
(3) Every pure perfeotion is oommunioable. SootU& &1'-
gues for the oommunioability ot the pUJ:lle perfect.ions wi th J'epra 
59 ~'4., 167. 
60 reid., 167-168. 
61 ~. ~ •• 1, d. 26, q. un.; I, 994. 
62 Wolter, lba Tranlcendentallf 168. 
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to the Persons in the Divine Nature.b3 However, we can abstract 
his argument from its context and de.cribe it briefly. If the 
pure perfections were incommunicable, the defin1tion ot a pure 
pertection would be contradicted. Pol" a pure pertection i8 ·one 
which, In an,.thing baving it, it i. better to -have than not to 
have. a64 A pure pertectlon has been def1ned as that which oan be 
in many, as that wh10h many oan partioipate in. So a pure perteo-
t10n must be oOJlll'1unioable to many. 
(4.) Every pure perteotion is irreducib11 simple. It a 
pure pertection were composed of parts A and S, these parts would 
have to be pure pertectiona in order to constitute the original 
perfection. These parts would have to farm an essential unity, 
for an aacid.ntal unity could not constitute a pure perteotion. 
But the •• parts can make an essential unit,. only by being relatea 
as act and potency. But to be related as aot and potenoJ would be 
to make these parts mutuall,. pertectible and consequently imper-
tect. Bence the.e part. cannot be pure perteotlons. And hence a 
pure pertectton cannot be composed ot parts. For parts can never 
oonstitute a pure pertection. 6S 
Scotua' anal,..i. ot the pure pertections bas emph.ai.ed 
the characteristic ot cOIlpatlbility. We can see this empbasla on 
6.3 Ord,lnatl0, 1, d. 2, P. 2, q. 1-4.; II, 341. 
64 9Mgdl. q. 5; xxv, 216a. 
65 Wolter, ~ Transcendental., 169. 
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compatibility in the R! Primo Erincipio where Scotus establishes 
that: "Every pure perteotion la predicated. of the Highest Nature 
as necessa.l"ily existing there in the hIghest degree.·66 This is 
proven by showing that necessary existence in the Highest Natu:re 
is COE:eatible w1 th a pur. peJ-feotion. Wolter's analysis is to the 
point ~ a pure perfection ia by definition more perfect than what 
ia incompatible with it. Now It a pure pel"feotion Is incompatible 
With thl Supreme Nature, it would have to be .,re perfect than the 
m.ost ,ertec t na tare -- whioh is acontradic tion. Therefore a pur. 
pertection must be compatible with the Supreme Nature. Now a pure 
pertection cannot exist contingently in the Supreme Nature but 
must exist necessarily. For a pertection is more perfectly pos-
sessed necessarily than contingently, providing that neoessity ot 
inherence is not repuanant to a pure pertection, for it it were, 
a pure perfectIon would be exceeded by somethl~ inoompatible with 
it, that ls, by what can neceasarily exist in the Supreme Nature. 
Therefore, neces.i ty of being able to exist in the Supreme Nature 
is not repugnant to a pure pertectlon. And since it i8 possIble 
tor the unoausable '!rat Natur.~to posse.s a pure pertection nec-
essarily, theretore it doss poaseas it necessarily.67 
In examining Scotua t treatment of the pure perfections, 
we have seen him emphasiSing compatibility. compatibll1ty in the 
ra-doing ot Anselm's definition; compatIbIlity in the an"'~ ..:.., 
~\S Tovv~ ~ -'? ~" LOYOLA \S 67 Wolter, l!l!. :Iraqsoendentala, 172-173_, IINI\lI='R~ITY 
\. 
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the properties ot the pure perfectIons; and compatIbIlity in show 
Ing that the pure pertections mWl t exist in the Supreme Nature. 
Perhaps now we can see how and whf ScotU8 haa re-done 
the ontologIcal ar~ment ot Anselm. ScotU8 believea that In 
treating concepts auch as being and Infinity and the pure perrec-
ttons. he Is thinking real ooncept. trom which cons.quenc •• can 
be drawn tor this existent world. In Ohapter II. we sball s •• 
that Leibniz also treats concepts as ~.alltie, trom WhIch he can 
draw consequences for the .xlsten~ world. 
OHAPTER II 
LEIBNIZ 
The purpose ot this chapter is to de.cribe Leibn1z'. 
re~do1ng of the ontological argument; we may begin by noting hi. 
reterences to Descat-tes. Leibniz sWImlat'l£ea Descartes" ontologi-
cal argument tor the existenoe ot God aa follows: 
Descarte.' argument for the Existence ot God aasu.ea 
that the all-pertect beins,- or the neoessary being, is po.a1 
ble.. The argument comes to this: the all-pertect being in-
cludes in ita idea among other perteotions tbat of existins 
neoessat-ily; or the al1-perteot being is a necessary being_ 
How the neoessBrY being exists; therefore, the all-pertect 
being exists. l 
The argument, God is all-perteot and haa then tbe perteotion ot 
neoe •• a~ existence, is valid but needs strengthening. Laibnis 
writes. 
The Geometer., who are the pas t masters ot the art ot 
reasoning have realized that in order that proofs based on 
detinitions be valid one must show, or at least poatulat.j 
that the notion oomprised in any of the definitions uaed 1. 
possible. • •• The same preoaution is neoessary in every 
type ot reasoning, and ab.ove all in the d •• o~atration due to 
Anae1m, Archbishop ot Oanterbury (in 1ibro gontra tgaipl!9-
teg), whioh proves that since God 1. the greateat or _at . 
perteot being, He p08sess~. a1ao that perfection termed ex-
1 Leibn!z, "Reform ot the Ontological Argument'" ~ 
MonadoloSI !!! Leibniz with Introduction, Oqmmentuf and SgppliiiS !!£l Ea.aXI, trans. B.~arr, tos Ange1ea, 1930, ~ 
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istence, and that consequently He exists; an argument which 
was subjected to scrutiny by St. Thomas and other Scholas-
tice, and whioh was revived by M. des Oartes. Regarding this 
it must be said that the argument is quite valid, providing 
that the supremely perfeot being or the being possessing all 
perfections is possible. Par here we have the central char-
acteristic ot the divine nature--that its essence contalna 
its existence, i.e., that God exists provided only that ne 1, 
poaeible. And thus simply omitting all reterence to pertec-
tion, one can aal: It the Necessary Being is possible, Be 
exists--doubtless the most beautiful and important propoai-
tion ot the doctrine ot modalities, since it turnisbes a pas-
sage trom possibility to actuality and it is here and here 
alone that A Ro!se!& ess! valet gonse9u.nt~a.2 
Since Anselm and Descartes base their arguments for the existence 
ot God upon their definitions ot God, Leibnia points out that in 
proots based on definitions one must show or at least postulate 
that the notion used is .. possible... Then he. remark. that it it 
can be shown that God is possible, it would follow that God exist. 
because hi. essence contains his existence. 'rhus Lei bnis will em-
pbasize the establishing of the possibilitJ of God. 
Leibnia presenta three ways of establishing the possi-
bilitJ ot God: a) the postula tins w the presuming ot the possi-
bilityor the most perfect being until impossibility is shown; b) 
a proof of the possibility ot the nece.sary tieing Which., moves troll 
contingency to necessity; and c) an A Rrlor~ proof ot the possl-
bili ty of the moat perteot being which (uJtab1i'3hea the oompossi-
2 L$lbnls, Dl. Philosophiachen Sohrlrten 4Gn Gotttrie~ 
Wl1helm teibnla, IV, e~a.I. Gerhardt, Darmstadt, 1 0, 401-40!J 
trans. NIc60Iai Rescher, ·Oontlngence in the Philosophy ot Leih-
nis,· 'rhe Philosophical Revlex. LXI, 1952, 35. Gerhardt's aditiol 
hereafter referred to as ~erhardt. 
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bilit, ot the pure perteotion. • .3 
.) The tirst way, then, is the presumption ot the posai 
bl11tr ot God. Lelbnis writea. 
In my view It ,LDeacartes t 8.l"gumcflli/ 1a a good argument thoug 
lmJHlt-teet and what it lacks can be supplied. But even as 1t 
atands, imperfect and with nothing added, it baa conaiderabl 
value insotar as it proves tha t the d1 vine nature enjoys at 
least this priv1lege that it needs .only poasibility at .s-
sence in order to ex1st. What 18 1IOre, the argument gives 
at least presumptively the existenoe of God, fbI' all exi~t­
eMe must be thought poaaible in the abaeme ot proot to the 
contrary, until that is to aay, we aN made to see that 1t i 
impossible. ru. RreaU1llp!Q!'!t as we .r oall 1 t' i. 1ncaom-
parably higher than a .lmp:e supposition, aince moat aupposi 
tiona aust be pPaved betore they oan be adml tted, while what 
evep is presumed must pass as true until it 1s refuted. • • 
Bow possib11ity is alwa,. pre .... and must be beld true UD-
til impossibility i. proved. This argument accordinglx bas 
the tor.e that it la,.. the caRll! probandi; on him who dentes 
it, and ainoe no one oan preve ita lmpo8.ibl1itl we must hal 
God'. exi.tenae to be real.~ . 
Tllu. Lelbnia would aocept the ontological &l"Sument with tbe addi-
tlon that possibilit,. is alwa,.s presumed until impossibility is 
shown. And no one can prove the impossibility or God.> 
b) Hovever. Lelbniz admits that such a presumption does 
not 1"1801'"01181,. demonstl'8. te the existence ot the necessary beinS. 
So he otters an absolute dem.onstration ot' tOt poss1bil1t, of' God 
as the seoond wa1 ot establishing the possibility at' God. Leibnl 
writ •• , continuing the last text quoted. 
) Jacque • .Talabert, L,! Dlf)J.! de. Leibnlz, Paris. 1962, 
4 Lelbnlz, IfRetol'lft or the Ontological Argument, If l!!!. 
MonadoloSl. 1>S-156. 
S Qt. 1 7-$2. 
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Should we vish howeyer, to make the demonstration absolute 
in the manner or geometry we must give the proot of the pos-
aibllit.y which it requires. I .bave tried to contribute such 
a proot by making it evident that if the neoessary being 
were impossible, all the contingent beings would be impossi-
ble also, and so nothins would be possible. For sinoe oon-
tingent beings haYe not in themselves the sufficient reason 
of their existence they must have recourse to the necessary 
~eing, vh6 iah is the ulti. ratio rerum, the final ground ot 
things. 
The tinal sentence ot this text seems best interpreted as the 
proot ot th. pOSition stated in the same text that it the neces-
aary being is tapossible, all contingent being would be impossi-
ble. For tbt las t sentence argues that since contingent beings 
have not in themsel Yes the sufficient reason ot their existence, , 
they must tind their suftioient reason in tbe neoesaary being. 
The word "existence" was underlined in the last sentence to show 
that Leibniz has argued that, since oontingent beings MUS t tind 
the sufficient reason ot their existence in the necessary being, 
all contingent beings would be impossible it the necesBarY being 
would be impossible. Thus ve see that Leibnlz's position that 
the possibility ot contingent being is dependent on the possibil-
ity ot the necessary being bas required trom Leibnia a proot ot 
the actual existence ot the neoessary being. 
In the position that "it the nece.sary being were ~ 
possible, all cont1ngent be1ngs would be impossible," Le1bnis baa 
expres.ed the major of a oonditional syllogiSM whose conclus1on i 
6 Leibniz, "Retorm or the Ontological Argument," tbe 
Monado1oSI. 155-1$6. 
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to be that thl necessary being is possible. But nowhere in the 
text quoted or in the context does he express the minor ot this 
syllogism. Theretore we interpret that this minor premis. be 
supplied to make the conditional syllogism read as tollows: 
It the necessary being 1s impossible, all contingent 
beings would be impossible. 
But, some contingent being is pos.lble. 
TheNtore, the necessary being Is posaible. 
We have already seen bow Leibnlz establishes the major 
premiae. The minor premise, which lfe have supplled, _,. be known 
in either ot two ways, aa Leibnia writes' 
Being Is that whose concept lnvolves somethlng posltlve 
that ls, something which is able to be conceived by us in a 
way that that which,. conceive is posslble and does not In-
volve a contradiction. W. can know this tact ot posslbilltJ' 
It the oonoept 181 perfectl,. clear and does not Involve any-
thing cont'uaed. We can also tind out, It the thins aotuall,. 
shall have Insted, that that whioh exl.ts i8 also .Be1118 or 
a posslble;' 
For Lelbnia, the possibillt,. of cont1ngent being -1 be known 
either b1 an anal"sis or the ooncept of the thing ~ b1 discover-
ing that the thing actuall,. exists or has exlsted. 8 
7 Lelbniz. "De modo distlnguend1 phaenomena rea11a ab 
lmaglnarlls)" Gerhardt, VII. 319. 
8 Rescher, in his article, "Contingence in tbe Philos-
ophy ot Lelbniz," The !hl!. aeView, LXI, 3S, translate. a text 
tl'Om Gerhardt, Iv,406. aa tollows. "Those who hold that one can 
never inter actual existence 801ely trom notlons, ideaa, det1n1-
tiona, or possi ble essence. • .den,. the p08sibl1l t1 ot the .eo.,-
saPr Being •••• But 1t the Necessary Being or Ens ~~ 18 im. 
possible, then allot the things which owe thelr exIstence to 
others will also be impossible, since the,. mua t ultima tel,. st •• 
t'ram the Ens a .e. Thus no existenoe at all will be posslble •• 
This reasonr - leads us to another modal roposltion.. • whloh 
The first way in which the possibility ot oontingent 
being is known by an analysi. ot the concept ot a contingent be-
ing makes this argument trom contingency very much like Leibnis'. 
argument tor God's existence trom the reality of eternal truths. 
For just as it is sutticient to make an analysis ot a ooncept to 
show the possibility ot oontingent being, so also It 11 suffloien 
tor him to make an analysis ot a oonoept to show the reality ot 
eternal truth. And ju.t as there 1. an Interenoe trom the possl-
bllity ot oontlngent belng to the possibillty ot the neces.ary 
belng, so a180 i& there an,int.renoe trom the reallty ot eternal 
truths to the Supreme Mlnd whioh 18 God. Leibniz write.: 
A. regards eternal truths, it mu.t be observed that at bot-
tom they are all oonditlonal, and say In ettect: such a 
th1ng posited, .uch another thing il. For example, In la1-
ing evert tigqre which b!! three sIdes Kill al.o have,tbr., 
anile!, do nothlng but suppose that if the~e !s-a-?fgure 
wlth three 11des this same figure wlll have three angles •• 
The soholastlc. have dlsputed hotly • • • how the propo 
sition made about a subject can have a real truth, It thla 
subject does not exlst. The tact 11 that the truth il only 
condltional. • •• But it will be further asked, In what 1 
joined with the previous one Llrom tr.tno~e two: It the N.cessar 
Belng is posslble, then He must exls completes the d.-onatra-
tion. Thil propo.ltion can be tormu ated thus: It" tbe,,;N.o •• sal'7 
aeing does not .xist, n.ith!r wll1 anything .1 ••• • Re.cher then 
believes that Leibniz Implles a mln~r afflrming the exlstenc. ot 
a contingent being, whlch, when Joined to the la.t sentenoe in hi 
translation, would lead to a conclusion affirming the existenoe 0 
the Necessary Being. But ReSJ!ber haa indirectl,. translated that 
last sentence: ·Si l'Estr. Laii7 neoes.aire n'e.t point, 11 n'J 
a point d'Eatre filii possible. It should be ;ranalated thusl 
dIt there 18 no Jeeessary Being, there ls no possible being.d 
Reseherts interpretation is incorrect. 
.. 
thls oonnectlon Lbetween subject and predlcati7 founded, 
slnoe there ls In It some reallty which does not deceive? 
The reply will be that It ls the connection of Ideas. But 
in answer it will be asked, where would those Ideas be If no 
mind existed, and what would then become ot the real founda-
tlon of this certainty ot eternal truths? This leads us ti-
nall,. to the ultimate ground of truths, namely to that !s-
ereme !!!!! Unlversal !!!:m., which cannot tail to exlst ... whose 
understanding Is the region ot eternal truths •••• ~ 
Leibni. is certain that hi. mind knows an eternal truth and that 
the gN>Und ot thls certainty 11es in the ideas themselves, inde-
pendentl,. ot the senses.10 An u1 t1mate ground of the certaint,. 
ot eternal truths is required which cannot fall to exist. This 
u1t1mate ground of truths ls the Mind ot God. 
Because the argument trom contingenoy starts with an 
analysis ot a conoept and concludes to the u1timat. ground or be-
ing and because the argument trom the certainty ot eternal tr~th. 
starts with an analysis ot a concept and concludes to the ulti-
mate ground ot truth, it appears that they are basically the same 
argument. Thi. interpretation i. confirmed by a text in the Mo· 
9Id01081 where LeIbnIz equates pos.ib1es, essenees, and eternal 
truths. He writes: 
43. It is alsQ true that in God i. the source not only ot 
existence. but alao ot essenoes, so tar as they are real, or 
ot that whloh i. real in the possible. This i. be~aU8e the 
understanding ot God i. the region ot eternal truth., or ot 
9 Leionia, "New Essays on Human UnderstandIng,· Le1b-
nia Se1ectionl, ed. P. Wiener, New York, 477. Wiener's edition 
hereafter ret erred to as Wiener. 
10 Leibni., "Hew Bs.ays on Human Understanding;" Wie-
ner 66. . . 
tbe ideas on which they depend, and because, without him, 
there would be nothlng real in the p08s1bllitles, and not 0 
~1 nothlng exlsting but also nothing possible. 
44. For, If there Is a reallty In essences or posslbl11tles 
or Indeed in the eternal truths, this reallty must be found .... 
ed in something exlsting and actual, and consequently in the 
exlstence of the necessary being In whom essenoe involves 
existenoe, or wlth whom it is sufflcient to be possible in 
order to be aotual. ll 
Leibniz has said that the understanding of God is the region of 
eternal truths, that is, the region of the Ideas on wblch the 
eternal truths depend. And the ideas, essenoes, and po.aibles ar 
the same t07! Leibniz. Thus the proof trom contingenoy and tbe 
proof trom eternal truths are basioally the same sinoe they both 
start with the reallty involved in the posslbles or essences. 
We have seen one interpretatlon of the conneotion at tb 
argument from contingency wi tb tbe ontologice.l argument by seelng 
bow the minor ot the oondi tional syllogism was evldent by' an anal 
ysls ot the ooncept or essence of a contingent thing. '.fhere 
should be another interpretat10n 1t the minor ot the condltional 
syllog1s. 1s evident by discovering that some contingent actually 
exists. Then Leibn1z is argu1ng that some contingent being Is 
posslble because it 1. actual and that this possibility vt oontin 
gent being is dependent upon tbe possibility of the necessar,. be-
ing. But the question should be asked: bow does he know that 
this being which exists i. contlngent? 
To answer that questlon we must Investigate Leibni.-, 
-
11 Leibniz, MMonado10gYi Q Wiener, S41. 
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notion ot truth. His idea ot a true proposition is -such that 
~very predicate, necessary or contIngent, past, present, or tuture. 
Is included In the idea of the subJeot. u12 The predioate is con-
tained in the subjeot of a true proposition in one of two ways. 
For Leibniz holds that there are two kinds ot truths: 
those ot reasoning and those of tact. Truths ot reasoning 
are necessary and their opposite-r;-impossible, and those 
ot tact are oontingent and their opposite is possible. l ,) 
In truths ot reasoning, the predioate is expressly oontained in tru 
notIon ot its sUbJect,14 and the opposite ot the truth is impos.i-
ble sinc. the opposIte would express a contradiotion. But in 
truths of fact, the predicate is only implicitly contained in the 
notion ot its 8ubJ~ct,l5 and th~ opposite of the truth is possible 
since the opposite would not express a contradiction. 
Now we are able to understand why Leibniz holds that 
there are contingent beings. It is the same reason why a man's 
tree choice Is oontingent. As Leibniz writes, a tree choice 1. 
ncontingent, beoause neither I nor any other m~nd more enlightened 
than I, could demonstrate that the opposite ot this truth impli •• 
12 Leibnlz, "Letter to Hessen-Rheintels, May, 1686; • 
Wiener, 97. 
13 Leibniz, IfMonado1ogy, 33; If Wiener, 539. 




a contrad1ct1on. n16 Thus Leibn1z holds that a tree cno1ce 18 con-
tingent and that a being is contingent because he cannot demon-
strate that the opposite ot the tree choice or of the being 1mplie. 
a contradictlon. Por Leibnlz wrltes ot the proposition about hi .... 
selt that ! exist: 
i8 a proposition of fact. founded upon an immediate experi-
ence, and it 1. not a necessarr proposition whos. necessity 
is seen in the 1mmediate agreement ot 1deaa. On the contrary, 
there 1s no one but God who 8ee8 how these two terms 1 and 
existeno! are conneoted. that is, why I ex1st.17 
Only God can make the infinite analysialS required to examine all 
the possibles and tbeir relationshlps .. in order to know why the 
essence of Lelbnla would oontribute to the best possible world19 
and therefore would exlst. We have uncovered the reason why Le1b-
niz holds that a being 1s cont1ngent. His reason ls that there 1. 
no immediate agreement of the ideas 1 and .sstenoe and thus there 
is no contradiotion 1n sa71ns "l d~ Dot tx18t.lt20 
16 Le1bniz, "an Necessity and Oontlngenoy," Wiener, 481. 
17 Leibniz, a_ew 88saY8 on Human !novledatl" Wiener, 
469. 
18 Le1bnlz, "Speoimen calouli univers&lis," WIener, 98. 
99. 
19 Leibniz. "On the Ultimate O%'1gin ot TbinpJ" Viener, 
347-348. Of. lnb-~, .54-.5.5. 
-
20 Although it i8 necesaary that the e8sence ot Leibniz 
exi8t, this neoesaity of existence doea not destroy the contiDae~ 
cy ot his existenoe. Leibnia wri test "And God bas chosen allOns 
an infinIte number ot pos.ibles what he has Judged most tit •••• 
Thi. i. the neceasity, wbiob oan now be aaor:t.bed to things in tbe 
In examining LeIbniz t s oonditional .yl1ogi~ proving 
the possibilIty of God trom contingenoy, we have seen two ways ot 
eatablishing the minor premise. ·Some contingent being is pos.i-
ble.· One way was by the analysis ot the concept ot a contingent 
being. The other way wM by judging that .ome oontingent being 
actually exists. 
c) ~ina+ly, Lelbniz otters an ~ priori proot ot the 
possibility ot God. Sefore we desoribe this A priori proof, how-
ever, we should .e. what Leibniz •• ys about knowing the possibili-
ty of • thing A 2r~ori. He w~it.sl 
The possibilltX ot a thing, however, is known either ~ jri 
.2l! or A posteriori: the tormer, vum 'lie ana11s. the i •• 
Into its elements, that is, into other ideas whose possibil-
i t1 1a known, and know tha tit oontains nothlna whioh is in-
compatible. Por example, thi. is the case when we perceive 
the manner in whioh an objeot is produced, whenoe cays" 
detinitions are of suoh paramount significanoe. On the oth-
er hand, we reoogni •• the S ~teriorl possibility ot a 
thing when its aotuality 1s ~wn to us through experienoe. 
Por whatever exists or bas eli-ted must. in any oa •• b. possl~ 
ble. In any oa •• ot adequate knowledge we ha.e at the same 
ttme an ~ priori knowledge or the pos.ibility} to wit, it w. 
have oarried the analysiS through to the end and no oontra-
diotion i. visible, the po •• ibill t7 ot the idea i. demonstra .. 
ted. But whether human knowledge vill ever attain to a per-
.teet analy.l. ot 1dea., hence to «.1"8' Resaib111tl an4 to 
unanalrsable conoepts--in othe,r words. v etaer It ,,111l) • 
.. 
.tuture, whioh is called hYRothe~1cal or oonsequential neo .. s1t7 (that is to aaYt founded upon t • oonsequenoe ot the hypothesi. ot 
the ohoioe made J, which does not d.s troy the oontingenoy ot thinss, 
and does n.~t produoe that absolute neoess1ty whioh contina_no., cSoew 
not allow.- (Leibn1s, ·On Beee.sity and OontingenoT;" WieneF. 480-
481). tho •• truths and things are absolutely Ileoe.sary whos. oppo-
sit.s imply a oontradiction. Thos. truths and things are Gontin-
gent who.e opposite. do not imply a oontradiction in terma. 
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able to ~educe all thoughts to the absolute att~ibute. ot Go 
h1mselt, --to ri~st causes and the tinal reason of things 
that i8 a guestion whioh I do not due to corusider- 01' deoide just now. 21 
Leibniz would know the possibility ot a thing ~ 2rIor~ by r.aolvi~ 
the conoept of the thing into its oomponent parts which must be 
known to be, first, possible in them.~lves, and seoondly, compatI-
ble with each other. This analysis into the component. of a con-
cept is called adequate knowled~ when it 18 perfeotly done. In 
this ad.equate knowledge, the knoWer recognIzes the object present, 
disoerns the speoifio notes ot the object, and make. an analysiS 
oomplete to the end of the oomponent8 ot the objeot. 22 LeIbnIz 
does not know it man is able to have suoh ad~quate knowledge but 
saya that the beat example whioh approaches very oloaely to ade-
quate knowledge 1. our knowledge ot numbera. 23 It i. signifioant 
to note that Le1bniz doubts whether sdequat~ knowledge is availa-
ble to man, and it i. a180 sign1fioant to note that Leibniz has 
said in the last text that he does not now dare to ~etermin6 whetb 
er or not man can make a perfect analysis which would finally 
reaoh the first possibles and irresolubile notions, the very abao-
lute attributes of God. The.e two doubts are signIficant because 
they would a.e. to weaken the oertainty ot any demonstration ~ Rri. 
Ideas. It ,
21 Leibniz l "Refleotions on Knowled~, Truth and Wiener, 287-28tl. 
22 Ibid •• 28)-285. 
-
2.3 Ibid •• 285. 
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~ ot the possibility ot any thing, .specially of God. 
However, Leiona does not hesltate to present an .! eri-
2£! demonstration ot the possibility ot God. The criterion that 
he uses tor ~.tabll.hlng the possibility ot anything ls twotold: 
flrst, the ooncept ls r.solved Into 1ts oomponent parts whloh must 
be known to be possible in tbe.s.lves, and s.oondly, the oomponent 
parts must be oompatlble wlth one another, tbat ls, non-oontradio-
tory with one another. Lelbnlz tultills thls twofold orlterion by 
showing th ... two thlngs: tlrst, that there exist quallties sus.ep-
tible ot perteotlon in the highest degree; and .eoondly, tbat all 
these perfeotlons aXle compatlb1e. 
HeXle are examples whioh illustrate tbat there are per-
tectlons susceptible ot inflnlty. as Lelbniz wrltess 
W. must also know what pertection ls. One thins that 
can surely be affirmed about it ls th~t tho.e tora or ~~ 
tures which are not susceptible ot It to the bighest degree, 
say the nature ot numbers or ot t1gur •• , 40 DOt perm1 t ot 
pertection. Thls 11 becaule the number whlch 1. tbe greatest 
ot all (that ls, the sum ot all the nuabers), and 11kewlse 
"\he greatest ot all figures, lmply oontr&d,"otiona. The sre .. t" 
est kno1fl~. howeyer, and omnlpotenoe oontain no Impossl-
bility.24-
The contradictlon In the sum ot all the numbers ls tbat tbe whole 
would equal the part ainoe th~ sum ot !l! numbers would Include 
Its.1t. 2$ Elsewhere Leibnlz explains what the oontradiction ls in 
291. 
~ LeIbnlz, "Discourse on Metaphyslcl;· Wlener, 290-
2$ telbnia, "Letter to a.moull11, 1698;n WIener, 99. 
48 
the notion of the tastest motlon. Be assumes that a whe.l is turn-
ing with the tastest motion: then he points out thi. contradiotionl 
it one ot the wh.el'. spokes Is extended beyond the rlm, the 
spoke-. end poInt would be moving taster than a nail lylng on the 
2.6 
rim, whose lIIotlon ls theretore not the tast •• t. In oontrast to 
contradictions round in the notions of the taste.t motion and the 
greatest number, Lelbnis holds that th.~e are no contradlctions in 
the notions of the great.st knowledge and of amnlpotenoe. Because 
be can dlscover no contradiction In tho.e ConCeptI, he holds tbat 
they are posslble, that they ~taln no impo.slbility. 
In a short paper. -Quod Efta P.~t.otl.s~ existit,· 
Leibnis tells us exaotly what he means by • pertection. He wrlt •• 
I call a pertection every aimple quality whlch ls posi-
tive and absolute, or which expresses whatever It express.s 
without any limits. 
aecauae a quality ot this kind is at.ple, 1t is there-
tore irresolubl1e or Indetl~bl.. Por otherwis., eIther the 
simple quallty would not be one but an aggregate or many, or 
1t 1t were one, It would 1)e clrowucrlbed by lUdts, and 
thus 1t would b. 'understood by the negatlon ot something ul-
t.rlo~. but that ls agalnat the hypothesls whioh a.sumes 
that; the quallty 11 purely pOlltlve.27 
A perteotion 18 a Simple quallty whioh 18 posltlve and absolute. 
·Simple- means that the quallty ls not made ot parts. "Posltive" 
means that the quality expresses a reallty whloh ls not understood 
Ideal." 
26 Lelbnizt -Retleotionl on Knowledge, Truth. ~ Wiener, 286-2~7. 
27 Lelbnia, "Quod Bns Perteotl.slmum exlstitj· Ger-
hardt, VII, 261. 
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by any negation. And since the quality is not understood by any 
negation, the quality expres.es a reality which is, a. conceived, 
without limita, that is, the quality is Mabsolute. 8 
The other require.ent that the qualities should be cam-
patible with one another is fultilled by hi. universal oharaoter-
istio. ae writes. 
But tor the pre.ent it i. sutficient tor me to remark that 
that which i. the toundation ot my oharaoteristio is the saUN 
as the demonstration ot the existence ot God. Por the aimplt 
thoughts are the elements ot the oharacter1stic, and the s1m-
ple forma are the source ot thing.. So I suppose that the 
aimpl~ torms are compatible among themselves. That is a 
proposition whioh I would not be able to demonstrate very 
well without explaining at length the tundamentals ot the 
characteristic. But it that proposition ia granted, it to1-
low. that the nature or God, wh1ch ena1ose. all the simple 
torms absolutely taken, i. po.sible.2~ 
Leibnlz holds that his thoughts are a t~e representation of reali. 
ty and that God is really possible it the simple torma or thought. 
are compatible. That the simple forms, that ia, the pertections, 
are compatible ls shown in hi. short paper, -Quod Ens Pertecti.si· 
mum exl.tit.- Prom the detinitlon of perfection as a simple qual-
ity he argues that all the p~rtectlon. are compatible. He write •• 
Prom thls Ldetlnition ot perteotloB7 it 1. not dltticul1 
to show that all the pertections are oompatible among them-
selve., that i8, that the,. can exist in the same sUbjeot. 
Por let there be a proposition ot this kind. 
! ~ ~ are Incompatible 
(understanding through A and B two slmple forma or perteo-
tlons, and it 1s the same it many simple forma are taken at 
28 Lelbniz, Unt1tled letter; Gerhardt, IV, 296. 
the same time) it is olear that that proposition is not able 
to be damonstrated ~ithout a resolution at te~s A and S, 
either at one ot the two or ot both. Por otherwise tbe na-
ture ot those things would not enter into a reasoning proce •• 
and incompatibility would be able to be demonstrated .quall,. 
about any other things and about themselves. But (by hypoth-
.81.) they are irre.oluble. Theretore this proposition .boui 
them cannot be demonstrated. 
But this proposit1on would be able to be demonstrated 
about them it the proposJJtion were true, beoause it 1. not 
true through It.elt and because all propositiona n.c •••• rily 
true are either demonstrable or known through th.aselves. 
Theretore this propos1tion is not nece.sArily tru.. Or in 
other words ~h. proposition rejected i!/. it 1s not neoeaaar-
y that A and Bare 1n the same subject~ 'lOr aga1B7 there tore 
A and B cannot be in the same subjeot. 'her.tore, 8ince the 
reasoning about any ot these qualit1es 1s the aame, all tbe 
perfections are oompatible. 
Theretore there is given or there can be understood. 
subject ot all pertections, the most perfect be1ng.29 
We can best su:mmar1ze the .import ot this text by these tour point. 
First, A and B refe~ to any simple pertectlon. of whlch we can hay. 
proper ideas suoh as the greatest knowled~ and omnipotence. Bow 
God 1. derined as the subject ot all slmple perteotions, the most 
pertect being. Although this concept doe. not exhaust or adequate. 
ly derine God, still the cono~pt will represent th~ possibility ot 
God, if the a1Jnple pertections are oompatible. Secondly, to p~ve 
that all the simple ?e~.ctions are compatible ls impossible, 
sinoe the number ot such is lnflnite and we would never be able to 
compare them all. Thirdly, therefore Leibniz proves that indirect-
ly by showing that it ls not necessary that A and Bare incompati. 
ble--where A and B reter to any simple perfectlons. It it is not 
29 Leibn1z~ dQuod Ens Pe~teotis.1mum exiatit;" Ger-
hardt, VII, 261-262. 
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neoessary that A and Bare inoompatib1e, it Is at least poasible, 
i.e. non-contradiotory, that they are not inoompatlbleand so are 
compatIble. Pourthly, to show that It is not necessary that A and 
B are incompatIble, Leibniz considers the proposition that it Is 
neoessary that A and B are Incompatible. It this proposItion Is 
neoessarily true, it must be either selt-evld~nt from the terma 
or demonstrable by finding a mIddle te~. But the proposItion 1. 
not selt-evident alnoe Leibni. oannot disoover any Inoompat1bil1ty 
1n the conoepts ot A and B. And neither is the propos1tlon able 
to be demonstrated. For A and B are simple and lrre.olubile terma 
and no middle term o~ld be found agreeing with A and B, since A 
must Petain its distinotion from the midd1~ term and trom B. A 
demonstration would require the imposs1ble, that Is, findIng a 
middle term 1n tne conoepts or A and 8, that 1s, tlnd1na a complex 
1ty in two Simple concepts. Since thIs proposItion. it Is necea-
sary that A and B are incompatIble, 1s noither selt-evident nor 
demonstrable, the proposition :nust be talafh Therefore this 1. 
true that 1t Is not necessary that A and B are incompatible. 
Theretore it,is possible that A and Bare oompatible. Since A and 
B reter to any simple perfeotlons, it 1s possIble that all ~1mple 
pert."tionl a.re compatible. Ther&rozoo, Le1bni~ oan understand the 
ide. ot a being possessing all sImple perteotiona. 
Leibn1a hal fulfilled th~ two requirements tor demon-
stratIng the pos.ibll1ty ot God ~ Rriori. The first requ1rement 
waa that there be qualities possible of perfeotion in the highest 
degre.. (the .econd requirement waa that theae qualities be 001ll-
patible. Althougb tbe oompatibllity of tbe.e slmple perfections 
doe. not exhauat tbe reality ot God, stlll the compatibll1t, ot 
the.e pertectlona doe.repre.ent the po.slbility ot God. POI' Lelb~ 
nis doe. bave adequate 1de •• ot ~ea. pertections. Thes. adequate 
Ideas are objeotl.e concepta and represent what 18 posslble. 
Uter thi • .!et1ori J)!'Oot. Leibnla tell. ua w117 be haa 
oonstructed it. The turninS point ot the arausent ls t~e Ide. ot 
God. De ••• rtes only appeals to tbe experlenoe ot the Idea in bl. 
mind} he doe. not tell other. how to bav. the .... experienoe. 
telonia, by this A 21'101"1 proot, has Instructe. other. how to bave 
the experience ot the ldea ot God. 30 
Pro. the Po •• lbllit!!!.£ ~ .i.2 !!!. Actual !lsi.HUe 
In the .! -erio£1 proal'. there i. a m.oVement .from. God'. 
po •• ibili ty to Hi. aotual exi.tence. Leibn1. wri tea tihat existen •• 
1. a pertection and henoe that the being posse •• lng all pGrteotiom 
. 
~t exIst: "Whenoe It 1. olear that this beins exists, since ex-
istenoe is contained in the number ot perteotions.d)l 
Although be has mere11 •••• rt.d. here th.t exi.tenoe 1 • 
• perteotion, hi. tr .. ~ent ot the movement tram the po •• ibility 
to the aotuality ot the a08t pertect being i. not lightly done. 
)0 Ibi4., 262. 
31 Ib&4. 
Fo~ 1n one re.do1ng ot the ontological argument, he remarks that 
perfections see. to b. certain qualitle. and that exlat.nc. ls not 
like th.a. qua11tl.a. 32 BoveY.p, hi. b.alc crlte~ion tor jUdging 
whether o~ not .xistence i" a perteotion 1, that existenoe must In-
ore •• e the reality ot' th.e thing oonoeiYed. w. ae'e thia orlterion 
used when Lelbnil reaol.ea hia doubt and de01de. that existence i. 
a perteotlons "It 1. a1ao olear that Existence 18 a pertection, 
or In other words, that it inoreases ~eallty, that is, that more 
ot reall ty Is ooncei .,ed when an exi. tent A 1. oonoel Ted than when 
a posalble A 1s oonoelyed. A33 Thus Lelbnia holds that .xi.tenoe 
1. a realIty, that realIty ls a positlv. predIcate, and that a 
thing conoeived •• eXisting baa mope :reallty than the SUle thing 
oonc.ived aspo.slble.~ Theretore, sinoe exi.teno. is a perteo-
tion, the moa t perfect belng must ha,ye the pert.ctlon ot actually 
exlsting. 
It would be helpful to our understandIng or ~elbnll to 
Indicat. how ba.lc h. regard. hi. teachIng that all possIble. or 
•••• no •• tend. toward •• xisteno.. Prom the aotual .xlstence ot con. 
tingent being_, Lelbn1a di.cerna' that ••• enoes tend toward8 exiat-
32 Lelbnll, "Oolloquium cum Dna. Eooardo ProteaaoN 
Hlntelensl Oarte.lano, praesente Dr.I4. Abbatl. Molan! hat ...... " 16176 Ge~hardt, I. 214. 
266. 
33 Lelbnlz, "L.ibnlz an Bokhard, 1671;" Gerhard', I, 
34 Lelbn1z, "Marginal not •• of Lelbnla 1n a letter trOJ 
EOkhard to Lelbnla, 1677," Gerhardt; I, 226-227. 
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enoe. H. wrltes, that I 
w. ought tir.t to r.oognize that trom the .".ry taot that 
somethins exists rath.r ttoan mthlns. there i. In po.sible 
thing., that 1., in the very po.sibility or •••• ne. a cep-
taln exigent need ot existence, and .0 to apeak, aoae clat. 
to existenoe; 1n a word, that •••• no. tend. ot It.elt towarda 
8xlateno •• 35 ' 
This proposition that eve1!'1 po.sible tend. to ex.ist i. held by 
Leibn1z to be an absolutely tlrat trutn ot tact trom whloh all 
tacta can be d.monstrated.)6 In a footnote to his proot ot tbat 
tlrat truth of tact, Leibn1z :remark. that exiatence 1. the .".Py 
exlgen01 ot inclination ot the e •• enoe to 8x18t. 37 Benoe we s •• 
that Lelbn! z emphasiz •••••• no. or po •• ibll1ty .0 much ibat he 
regards .xi.tence .s a consaQ.q..no. ot •••• no •• 
Thi •• m)hasia ot •••• no. a. tbe prinolpl. ot existence 
can be .een in Leibnia's demonstration ot the exi.tence ot the 
best possible 'World. Arguins tJsom the po.ition tbat ••• enoe tena 
ot It.elf towards exi.tence, Lelbni. writes: 
Wheno. it turth.r tollows that all po. 51 bl. thing., vb.thap 
expre.sing •••• nc. or posslble rea11ty, tend by equal riCht 
toward exiatenoe, acoording to their quantity ot a.se~e or 
reality, or acoording to the degree ot pertection which tbeJ 
oontaln, tor pertectlon i. nothing al •• than quantlty ot 
a.seno •• 
Hence l' 1. 1Il0st ole&J-ly und.r.tood that amoq thl Infi-
nlt. oombinatlon. ot po.sibl •• and possible .eri •• , that 
Omnla, 
.3.$ Lelbnls, "Dl.cours .• on Metaphyslc.," Wlen.r, 341. 
36 Lelbnlz, Ro. Verltatlbu. Primi.," Op.ra Phl1osophica 
ad. J.B. ErtdmaM, Mel •• nhe1m, 19.$9, 99. 
31 Ibld. 
ss 
one aotually exists by wh1eh the most of essenoe or ot po •• 1 
b11ity is brought into eXi,tence. And indeed there is al-
ways in things a principle otdetermina tion which is based 
on oonsideration of maximum and minimum. suoh that the great 
.st etrect is obta1ned with the least, so to speak, expendi-
ture. • •• So it being once posited that being i. better 
than not being. or that there i8 a reason why something rat 
81" than nothing should be, or that we must pas. trom the 
pos8ible to the aotual, 1t, tollow that even it nothillg tuP-
ther i. determined~8the quantity at existence must be aa 
gr_ t as po.sible." 
Sino. all possibles tend by equal right toward existenoe aocording 
,to the_quantity at essence, that combination ot pOI.ibles (1 •••• 
the best possible world) must exist by which the MOst ot essenoa 
is brought into existence. 
Such an argument may also be applied to God tor Laib-
01 •• 39 POl" he write. that "Since nothing can hinder the po.a1bil-
ity ot that which possesses no limitations, no negation, and con-
sequently, no contradiotion, this alone is suffioient to e.tabliah 
the exi.t.nce ot God .! priori."4.0 Since the divine essence baa no 
limitation. that is, since the divine essenoe contains the gpe.t-
est quantity ot essence, the divine .ssence must exist. Leibniz 
does apeak of the most p~rt.ct be1ng as "the one that contalna the 
348. 
38 Lelbn1z, "Diacourse on Metaphysics;" Wiener, 347-
)9 ~h1a 1. the insight ot Wl11iam May, "The God ot 
Lelbn1s," The Be. Scholaaticll., XXVI, Ootober, 1962, S16. 
4.0 teibnla, "Monadol08Y, 4.>;" Wiener, >41-542. 
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moat ot essence. M41 
We can now unde~st.nd Lelbnlz*n emphasls upon the po •• t 
bll1ty of God when he rema~k8 that God 1s ft a pure conaequence ot 
possible beIng,M42 tor Lelbni. regards existenoe as a consequence 
ot essence. LeibnIs has treated concepts aa objective, as repre-
sentative ot the possIbIlity ot an essence which may exist. His 
conoept ot God 18 a real~tz trom whioh he discovers that God ,x-
lata. 
41 LeIbnlz. Untitled fragment; WIener, 93. 
42 Lelbnlz, "Honadology. 40,· WIener, 540-541. 
OHAPTER III 
OOMPARISON AID lW.lLUATIOlf OF 
aOOTUS AND LEIBBIZ 
In thia ahapter ve ahall oompa:re and evaluate the re-
doings or the ontological argument by Sootua and Leibniz under two 
main headings, (1) proying the pos.ibility or God, and (2) movins 
f'rom the peasibili t1 of'God to Hi. aotual exiatenoe. 
Jll Proving t~e Poasibillty gl 004 
Both Sootua aDd Leibnla emphasize proving the aoapoaal-
bl1ity of the terma Involved in the concept of' GOd, t,;,r example, 
the terma "1ntinity" an4 Hbeing", and "bell1&" and the "simple per-
teetlons", and "necesslty" and "belng". Hov both mow the compos-
albl11 t1 of' the tera in .1allar ways: a) ei ther bJ' • conceptual 
anal,.ais ot the oonoept ot God, or b) b1 reterring to contingent 
being. 
a) the tirat way In whlch they try to establish the pos-
sibl1ity ot God i8 tbat tbt1 find that a conoeptual analysia can 
discern no contradiction in tbe oonoept ot God. 
Tbe view ot Scotu. ls tbat tbere 18 no contradlotion 1n 
the ooncept ot the great.st conceivable object because in it ls 
$7 
S8 
4iIl00".red th. prillAry object 01' the lntellect, i •••• Int'inlt1._ 
The terma, ''In.f'lnl ty· and "being", ar& eompo as Ib-J..6 • This compo •• l. 
bllity oannot be shown ~ Erlorl lIince no analy&is ot concepts 
could ~ind a neoesllaryouDnectlon b.twe~n infinIty and being. 
Rather th111 composllibll1ty ill shown by dll1covering that the analy-
Ill. ot the concept ot intinit~ being doe. not show any contradic-
tion. Seotus giv •• the tollowing argument as a J!.rsuasI~ reallon 
tor holdlDg the eompossibility ot infinity and bf!d.ng, 
Ju.t as .veryth1ng 1s allsumed to be pos.lble, it ita impos.i-
bility i. not apparent, so also all thinss are assumed to be 
compo.sible, 11' their non-oomposaibi11t,. is not manitest. 
Now there 1. no non-oompollsibl1ity apparent bere, tor it 1. 
not 01' the na ture 01' being to be tinite; nor do.s tlnit. ap-
pear to be an attribute coextensIve witb being. But 11' they 
were mutual11 l*epugnaftt. it would be tor one ot these r •• soft •• 
The ooextenslve attribute. which being pOIIseslI.a see. to be 
autrloientl, eVident. l 
Although Scotu. mak.s the assumption that compossibility ill to be 
p~lIumed unlella non-compossibl11ty is evident, he belleve. that tiM 
assumptlon Is not unreasonable and so oalla the proot a persuaslon .. 
Scotus notes that there a~ two case. which would ahow non-compoa. 
8ibilitJ' between Infinity and being. The tlrat c ••• is that tbe 
nature 01' belng mlght always bave to be conceived aa flnite. Ieo-
tus reJeots this alternative b,. hi. unl"ooal notlon ot belng. uni-
voclt,. ot belng ls an abstraction whloh ,resolnds trom the varloua 
mode. 01 b.ing. Just AS man may abstraot the ooncept ot beine 
trom the senelble aocldents and b,. this concept have a ooncept ot 
l Q:rd1n&tl0, 1. d. 2, q .• 1-21 II, 201. 
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subs tanc •• s being, so man _y abstraact the concept at being trom 
tinite being and thus have a concept ot being whioh mal be applioa-
ble to an intinite being. The second case which would show non-
oomposaibllit1 ot infinity and being would be that tinite 1. an 
attribute coextensive with being. But the only attribute. coexten-
sive with being are: ODe, true, and good, whereas the attribute 
tinite-intin1te i8 a disjunctive attribute ot being. Scotus hold. 
that in tbe disjunctive attl"1bute. we may conolud .... a universal 
rule that the more pertect extreme exi.t. it the l •• s pert.ct ex-
tre.e ot the disjunction exists. Allan Wolter baa pointed out 
that Sootua' analysis ot the tmplicationa ot an •••• ntial order 
.how. that wber. an e.sential ord.r exista, one member must tollow 
in our knowledge ~om the other member ot the disJunction. 2 Sinoe 
Scotu. has rej.cted tbe two ca.e. which would sbow non-compo.sibil-
ity between infinity and beins, be assume. that the intinite being 
i. poa.ible. 
Similarly to Scotu., Leibni& tries to e.tablish that God 
is possible because tbe intellect can discern no contradiction in 
the notion ot the supremely pertect being. One reason that Leibnil 
otters is exaotly the aame as one ot Scotu.s t reaaona. For Leibniz 
holds that all existence must be 2resumed po.aible until its impos. 
sibility is shown. The reason why no one oan show the impossibil-
ity ot God 1s shown in the ~ priori proof ot tbe possibility ot tb. 
2 Wolter, The Tran~2endental.. 159-161. 
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1110st perrect being. A. 3cotua do •• , Leibniz make. a conceptual 
analysis or the terms involved in the conoept ot God. We can sum-
marise the anal,.i. or Leibnis which e.tablishe •. th. possibility 
ot God. !. eriori. The criterion which Leibnis uses 141 tvo.told.1 
tirst, the cono.pt i. r •• ol .... d intO' it. component part. which lIlU4It 
be known to be po.sible, and secondly, the component part. must be 
cOJIlpatibl. or compo •• ible. Be tultill. that twotold cri tar ion by 
showing the follovingl tirst, that there existqualitie. po •• ibl. 
ot pertection in the bigh •• t degre., aDd ,eoondly, that all the.e 
perteotion. are compatible. A. to tbe .tirst requirement, Leibnia 
notes that lithe grea t.st knowledge a or the "all-mishty'* do not im-
ply a contradiction, whereas the oono.pt ot the gr.at.st number 
doe. imply a contx-adiction. Pw the .um ot all numbex-. would have 
to be the sua ot it.elt and all tbe otbex- nuaber.. But .uch a CoD 
cept as pertec t knowledge 1s pos.ib1e aince it haa no contradio-
tion. Bow using a definition of pertedtion as a slmple quallty 
which is purely positive and ab.olute, that is, Without limit., 
Leibniz trie. to p!'Ove that all the simple pertections are oompat-
ible. To do so, be oonsiders a pPOp08itioD that it is neo ••• ari11· 
true that A and B 8.1'Ie incompatible--where A and B refer to any 
aimple pertect.ion. ot whioh we have proper knowledge or Oan have 
.uch. Lelbrda make. t.his indirect app!'oaoh beoauae it i. impo •• i-
ble ~o proye that all .taple perteotions are compatible, since the 
number ot .uch is in£inite and we would never be able to oompaN 
th .. all. So, Leibnis oon.iders the con.equence. ot the nece.aar-
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i17 true proposition that A and Bare inoompatible. It the propo-
sition is necessarily true, it must be elther self-evident fro.. tnt 
ter_ or demons trable by finding a middle term. But tho proposi-
tion 1s not se1r-evident since Lelbniz cannot intuit any Inoompat-
lbl1it1 in the concepta ot A and B. And nelther 18 the proposltloJ 
able to be demonstrated. POl" A and B are slmp1e terms whioh oan-
not be resolved Into parts. tbus no middle term could be found a-
greeing witb A and S, since A and B MUst retain a distinction trom 
any middle tera. Since the proposition that it is neceaaarily 
t:rue that A and Bare ino01!lpatib1e i. neither se1t-evldent nor 
demonstrable, the proposition must be tal.e. Theretore this 1. 
true that it i8 not nec •• saP7 thf"t A and B are 1ncompatib1e. 
Theretore it 1s possible that A and It aN oompatib1e. Slnce A and 
B reter to any stmple perteot10ns, it is po.aible that all simple 
perteotlons are oompatib1e. Theretore, Leibniz Gan understand the 
ide. 01' a being po.sesslng all aimp1e perfections as a possible. 
Although the oompatibi1ity ot these simple pertections is not a 
pr9per conoept ot the essenoe ot' God, still the.e p«pteotiona rep-
resent the poaslbll1'y ot God. POl" Lelbnl. does have some idea ot 
these pert'ectloDa. And he be1iev.s that the.e ideas aN objeotlve 
concepta, that Is, representa'ive 01' what ls possible. 
Sinoe we have seen Leibni. make an argument t'or the POI-
siblli'7 ot God t'1"o. the compatibility ot simple perf.otions, we 
ma1 examine Scotua' treatment ot' the same perteotions. The liS-
ni.tJ..cant Wle ot' the pure perteotions 1. in the !! l?lmo Princi»10 
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vhe.re we have seen Scotua argue that eYIU.'"" pure perfectIon must 
exist In' the high •• t nil ture.. Scotul proyei that by showing that 
neee,ssar,. exiatenoe in the highest nature i. oompatible wlth a 
pure perteetlon. In that proof, 8eotua 1. argulng from a detini-
tion ot a pure perteetlon conoeived trom this world. A pure pep-
teotian ls that which 1 .. simpl,. and aOlolutel,. bette!' than any-
thing 1ncompa1;lble with it. Somehow Scotu. derivel the defin1tlon 
from thi s world. 
Perhaps we can C011l truot a re-do1ng ot Anselm's argument 
whioh would be in accord with Scotas t treatm,nt ot the propertl •• 
ot a pure pertectton. The tour aign!.t'lcant propertles are. (1) 
all pure p.!'tectlOhsAr~ mutually compatible; (2) all pure pert ••• 
tlons are compat1ble wi tb In!'ln1t1J (3) pure pertections are oom-
municable; aDd (4) pure" perteotions are irreduclbly aimple. Lelb-
niz bal based one ot hi. proofs ot the posslbi11 ty ot God. on tbe 
simpliclty ot pure p~rteotlon'. However, a Scotiatl0 proot ot 00. 
patlbllity ot the pure p.rteotiona would be baaed on the first two 
propert1es. Pirat, we would show that all pure perfeotion. ax-e 
mutually Incompatible. How 11nee a pure pertection i8 tbat whioh 
i. 8imp11 and absolute11 better than anything incomPQti~le with 
1t. A a8 a pure perfeotion must ~e better than B whioh 1. ineo ... 
patlble with A. But in 11ke mamer. B as a pure pertection will 
be better tban A whioh i. incompatible with B. It such mut~117 
contradictory propositions were true, then any given pure pex-teo-
tion 'WOuld be both bett.x- and not better than another pux-a perte .. 
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tlon. Since that contradiotion tollowa tl'Om holding that pure pel'-
tections al'8 incompatible t we mwJ t hold that evel'Y pure pel't80tion 
must be compatible with evel'Y othel' pUl'e perteotion. Tbi. oonse-
quenoe pl'e •• r ... e. the detinition ot a pUl'e pertection. Having til'S 
shown that all pure perteotions are oompatible, we seoondly show 
that e ... ery pure perteotlon is oompatible with inflnity_ To do 
this, we would have to presupp08e that Infinity ia a posltlve per-
teotion or mode of belng aDd that notb1ng Gould exoeed that wh10h 
is infinite. Nov 1t a pure perfeotion were inoompatible wltb in-
tinity. it would be better than 1ntinity_ POI' a pure pel'teotion 
is better tban anything 1ncompatlble with it. Btlt slnoe nothing 
can exoeed the Infinite, a pure pertection oannot exoeed the infl-
nite and thel'atore must b. compatible with infinity. 
i~. oompatibilit1 ot all pure pertection. with eacb oth-
er and with inf1nity do •• constitute a proof acoording to Soo'us' 
prinoiples of tbe possibilIty ot God. POI' we have a.en Soottl' ar-
gue :from the oomposa1bili t1 ot infini t7 and being tOT!' a proot ot 
the poa.ibi11ty ot God. Both Pl'oot. presuppo.e that 1ntinity 1. a 
p08itlv. pal'teotion or mod. ot being, even though OUl' knowle'" ot 
tbe infInite i8 by a negatiye detinit10n. the infinite la tha' 
which exo •• da the f1nl te not exaot11 by reason ot any t1n1te ..... -
ure, but in exoe.. of any .e.aure tbat oould be a •• lgned. We __ 1 
even say that both Pl'oof's &l'8 Hqu1red 1"01' proving that tbe infi-
nite be1ng who po •• esse. all perteotions 1. p08s1ble. 
b) Seoondly, Scotua and Leibniz try to estab11sh the po,. 
slbl1ity ot God by reterrlng to contIngent beIng. 
One perluasive reason tbat Scotua otters tor the COmpOI-
albility ot Intlnlty and being la tbe aotiylty ot intellect and 
will. Be apguea that jus' as the intellect can aeekaamething 
greater than any tinite beIng becaus. the lntellect experlenoe. 
Itself aa aeeklng more intelllgibility than tinit. beIngs exhibit 
ot the.s.lve., so allO tbe will oan love ao.ethina peater- than 
any tinite good beoaus. tlnlte good doe. DOt perfectll aatl.tl the 
will. Now it infln!te and good wer-e lncompatible and ao equiva-
lent to non-existence. the wll1 would hate an infInIte good Juat 
as It ntl tUI'alll hates non-existenoe. But the wIll do.s not bate 
an Infinite good, but even a.mk. 1t sInce tbe wIll 18 not a.tll-
tIed in any tlnite good. Theretor-e this tolloWI, tbat lnl1nlt. 
aDd good are cOMpOlslble. Another- per-suasIve re.aon tbat Scotua 
ottera is the analogJ that it Intln1 t1 II posslble on the level or 
quantity .a potential, tben infinity ought to be possible on the 
more pertect level ot beIng and .tricient causality. 
Scotua also establish •• the polsibilitl ot the firat 
.trlolent cau •• by a demonstration trom creaturel. Thil demonatra· 
tion or the possIbility ot tbe Flrlt Naturae with a triple primacy 
in effloienoy. tinality. and eminenoe, does not enter explloitly 
into the re-doing ot Ana.lm'l argument. Pietx-o Higliore, O.P.M. 
Oonv., believe. that tbe pe-dolns ot Anae1m'. al'gument tr-an.toNl 
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the Anselmian argument into the thi~d Sootistio way.3 This thi~d 
way 1s the argument whioh establishes the possibility or the most 
pertect na ture. It 1s very briefly stated by Sootus: 
The first oonclusion is that 80me erainent nature is simpl, 
tirst in perfection. This is ev1d~nt beoaus. an essential 
o~d.r exists among •• s.no.s. tor .s Aristotle puts 1t. tapaa 
are like numbera. And in such an order an ult1mate natu~e 1s 
to be found. fbia i. proved by the tive reasona given above 
tor a first being in the order of efficient causallty.4 
Migliore otters tbretl reason. wh, the re-d01ng ot AM elm's argu-
ment makes the argument into the third way ~t Scotus tor proYing 
the pos.ibility and actuality ot God. The first r~ason i. that 
ScOtu8 re-doe. the argument in the context ot a consideration 01" 
the eminence of the First Nature. His second reason is that 800-
tus argues in the re-doing that the greatest Object oonoeiYable 
without a oontradiction has an essential reality, !!A! gu14dltati-
~, beoause in it the primary object of the intellect, namely 
being, i. yerifled, and 1n the high~t degree, namely as the moat 
perteot be1ng. His third reason is that Scotus use. the .eoon4 
conclusion ot the proof' trom etficiency in the re-dolng in ordel' 
to show that the mo.t perteot being must aotually exist. It would 
be contradictory to the notion or the most perteat being that It 
haYe the imperrection ot being caused. Therefore the essence can-
) Pietro Migliore, O.P.M. aonv., "Aprlorismo Nella Dl~ 
o.trazione Scott.tica Dell'Esietenza Di Dio,· Miscellanea Frane.a-
gana, LII, 1952, 360-361. -
4 Orcll_1~. 1, 4. 2, q. 1-2, II, 161, trana. Wolt •• , 
DuDa 800t118, 48. 
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not be only in the underltanding but must actually exist ot it •• lt 
in order to pres.rve the statue 01' the .s •• noe as a possible. 
There is nothing in Sooti.tio ppincipl~a which would forbid Mia-
liore from oonneoting the proot ot the possibility of the pre-
eminent nature with the re-doing of Anselm'. argument. Howyer ". 
do not belieyethat Sootus intended auch a connection. Migliore 
18 misslng the signifioanoe ot tbe context in which Scotua tte-doe. 
An •• lm'. argument. The oontext .hows that Scotua is ottering pett-
.ua.i.e aPguments tor the oompOlsibillty 01' Intlrdty aDd b.lng, ot 
InfinIty and good. Then Jootus argues that in the sam. va,., An-
selm's 8J"gument _y be -oolotted. This ",ame _,." ..... tope pri-
, < 
-.rlly • persuasl Ye at-gument tor the composslb11i ty 01' being, tbe 
pnmary ob ject of the Intelleot. and Inf'lnl ty. the highest p08.i-
ble desre. ot being. EYen Scotus' u •• of' the .econd conclusion ot 
the Pl'OOf' tJ"ODl etflolenoy doe. not make the re-dolrlg dependent up-
on that p1"00f tttOJl etrlaienoy. We think that he uses tbat .econd 
oonolu.ion -.i1111 as a comparison showing that Just as the inti-
nite being 1I1U8t exl.t .inee It i. a contradiotion to ita nature 
to be oau .. d, 10 alao tbe tirat ertioient call •• must exi.t because 
It 18 a contradiotion to ita nature to be caused. Sootus then re-
tel'S to the second conolu.ion ot the proo1' 1'ttom • .trlclenoy beoaWle 
he doe. DOt wlah to establlsh the conclusion agaln .. 5 Howeyep he 
5 It il cleattly seen that the re-dolnga ot .Anselm·. att-
su-nt do not depend on the proo1' trom e1'ticienoy sine. the .econd 
l'e-doing establishes exi.tenoe by arguIng that Infinite aeing must 
be able to be intulted. 
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could haYe pl'OYen his point by bolding 1h a.t it would be an imper-
rection tor tbe most perrect nature to be caused. 
Althougb M1gl1ore do .. not se •• to be oorrect in what 
800tu. aotually aooomplishe. 1n the "-do1ng or Anselm'. argUllent, 
we can la, tbat hi. interpretation 1. In acoord with the ppinol-
pl •• of Seotus _ There is no ct')ntradiction 1n connecting the 
proots ot the possibility of the .irst Nature with tbe tplple pri-
macy with the re-doing ot An.elm'. apgument. We may conaide~ the 
demonstration of the pos.ibility ot the tir'st e :rtlcient cau.e to 
be a demonstration ot the pos.ibll1t, ot the infinite b.ina, alnoe 
Scows t proof or tbe infinity or the tlrat being is tound.ect upon 
the .SSInce or the tlrat being, DOt on its existence. We_7 
bpieny describe tbe proot troa etticienoy_ Scotua stuts with 
the possibility ot something being etticiently caused. This belng 
ls either caused by itaelt or by nothing or b7 something other 
than itselt. Since It _nnot. be oau.ed by It •• lt and aln08 noth-
ing oause. nothing, tb. po •• 1bl11ty ot .ometb1ngbe1ng caused :re-
quire. tbe possibllity ot an efficient cau... Eltber tMs poaal-
ble oau .. 1s tbe tirst po.slble efficlent cause or- it is a depen-
dent cause. It it 18 a depenc1ent cause, then ult1mately we lIlWIt 
conclude to the first possible efficient cau •• because of the !a-
po.sibillt,. and unintelligibility of an inf'lnlty of e.sential17 
6 
ordered causes. Seoau.e this cause is able to produce ita .tteot 
6 0 1. d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 1$1-161. 
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independently, that ls, because thls cau.e i. first, it i8 totally 
uncausable.7 
Leibniz has an argument s1milar to Scotus t demonstration 
01' the po •• iblllt1 of the tirst efficient cause. Lelbniz argue. 
trom tbe po •• ibillt7 ot contingent being to the possibility ot the 
•• 0 •••• l'1 Seing. We have summarised hi. reasonlng as tollow8: 
It the n.c •••• ry being 1& impo.sible, all contingent beings 
would be Impossible. 
But so .. oonting.nt being ls possible. 
Theretore the necessar1 being i. pos.ible. 
The .. jor premise ls evident b1 the interence that contingent be-
ings oan tind the sufficient reason of their existenoe only in the 
neces.ary being. Although Leibniz phra.e. the major in terms at 
01' possibility, the major i. evident only by a proot of the aotual 
existence or the nec.s.ary being. The minor prem1 •• i. known 
eitbt" by an analysis 01' the concept ot a oontlngent thlng or by 
d.lscovering that the thlng actual11 ex1sts or bas exlsted. 
It the posslbility ot a contingent belng is known by an 
analY8i. of th. concept 01' being, then Leibniz'. argument 1 •• imi-
lar to his proot tor God I. exi.tence tram the re.llty ot eternal 
trutha. Just as lt 1s 8l1tt1c"ient to make an ana11si8 ot a concept 
to ahow the pc •• ibi11ty 01' contingent being, so also it 1. sutti-
cient tor him to make an analysis ot a concept to .how the r •• l1t1 
ot an eternal truth. And Just as there 1s an interence trom the 
7 qrd1nat10, 1, d. 2, q. 1-2; II, 162-164. 
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poasibll1t,. ot oontlngent belns to the possibility ot th& neoes-
sary being, .0 also there 1. an inrerenoe from the reality or 
eternal truths to the Supre. lUnd which 18 GOd. Por Lelbnis is 
certain that hi. mind knows an eternal truth and that the ground 
at this oertainty lie. in the ideas them.elve., independently or 
the .enaes. An ultimate ground ot this certaintr ot eternal 
truths is required whloh oannot tail to exist. This ultimate 
gI-011nd ot tru ths 1. the Mind ot God. :rhe proofs trom oontingeno1 
and from eternal trutha are basioaU,. the ame alnoe they both 
start with the realIty involved 1n the possible. or essenoel. 
It the ainor premis. which a.aerta the possibility ot 
contlnglllt being is lmoWl'l, not by an analy.is or a concept, bu' 
by disoovering that something existent is contingent, then the 
P1"Obla mult be %tailled how he know. that this existent is contin-
gent. To anawer that proble., ve mu.t note that hi. theory of 
truth is that eve'1!'1 predicate, Deoe ••• l'7 or contingent, is in-
cluded in the idea or the subject. In truths ot reasoning, the 
predioate i8 necessarily and expressly oontained In the notion of 
ita SUbject, and the oppOSite ot the truth i. tapos.ible sinoe the 
opp08ite would expre.S a oontradiotion. But in truths of tact, 
the predi cate 1. oontingcmtly and impliol tly conta1ned in the no-
tion of it. subject, and the opposite or the truth 18 posslble 
s100e the opposlte would not express a oontradiotion. Lelbni& 
bold. that an existent i8 contingent because he oannot demonstrate 
that the oppOSite or the existent im.pli.s a contradiotion. Only 
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God can n.lB.ke the 1n:f'inl te analY1Jls required to examine all the 
possibles and their relationships to know why a particular easena 
would contribute to the best possible WOlt"'. 
We have sUlDIQAl"ize4 and compared- the arguments ot Scotus 
and Leionlz for the po,sibi11t,. ot God. They have ralsed the 
problelllt "Oan ve know the possibIlity ot God? U W. wll1 now dis-
cuss thia problem by evaluating the uguments which they have ot-
tereds a) by a oonoeptual anal,.lIla or the concept at God, and b) 
by reterring to oontingent being •. 
a)Sootua and Lelbn1s tr-y to prove God'. poaaibillt,. bY' 
an analysi. of t.he conoept ot God. Scows holds that his argumen 
i. demonet:ratl .. e. W. belie.,. that Sootul hold. hi. proot as per-
suaalve because ot the dl.tinct!on he makes between logIcal and 
Nal pasalbl1l t11 
A 10gloal pOI sIble i. a way ot composItion tor.med by the in-
tellect ot that whoae terma do not inol ucla a contradIction •• 
•• But a real possible 1s that vhiQh ia accepted rrom so .. 
potency inhering in something •••• H 
aecause he makes this distinction. his re-c1oing of the ontolo&loa 
argument doe. not demonstrativelY' ahow the ~.al possibility, that 
ls, the real composslbillt,-, of the lnfinite beinc. Scotua baa 
rejected an,- prgateE ~ demonstration ot the pos.lbl11t,- of the 
Infinite belng. A erop\er ~ demonstration would show po •• ibil-
itY' by rinding a nece •• arr conneotion between the terma IntinitJ 
8 Ordlnatio, 1, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4; II, 282. 
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and. being. Thi. neoessary connection would have to be round by 
an analysis of the term. infinity and being. But Scotul admitted 
in the context of the re-doing that no propter guld or ~ priori 
analysis could tind a necessary oonneotion between inflnity and 
being. The re-doing by the analys1s or the ooneept o:f intin1 te 
being only establi.he. logioal possibl1lty. 
Although only logical possibility is establlshed, Scotu 
believes that he has persuasively .stablished the possibility of 
the inf'ln1te being. We must further evaluate hi. proof. The 
following Inooherenoe. are the •• : (1) Saotus make. ~he key a.w 
s~ptlon ~hat the oompo •• ibility o:f infinity and being i. to be 
pre.w.d it incompatibillty Is not evident. Sootus thinks that 
the assumption i. not unreasonable. However, it appear. that the 
a.sumptlon is unreasonable. It only the Divine B,ing must exl.t 
It Be is po •• ible, then to assume that He ls possible 1s to make 
a very gl'ea t assumption. A very gr.a t as sumption :may very well b 
un:reascmable. (2) The infinite ls not positively understood, we 
have no Jroper oonoept ot the essenoe of God. For' Scotus defines 
tbe infinite as that which exceed. the :finite, not exaotly by 
reason or any finite measur'e. but 1n excess of an,. measure that 
could be a.slgned. ~om suCh a negative de:fIn1tIon. it i. 4iffi-
cult to determine whether or not actual Inflnity in being ls pos-
slble. tn Scotus arsue. that finite does not appear to be an 
attribu~e coextensive with being. Por the attribute tinite-inti-
nit. i. a disjunoti"e attribute ot being. However, Sootal bolds 
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as a universal rule that b,. positing the less perteot extreme we 
can conolude that the m:n.'e perfeot extreme ls realized in some 
other belng. But since we can only conclude by a reasoning pro-
oe.s from some finite being that some Inflnite being en.ts,sco-
tua 18 assuming what he should prove when he assumes that flnlte 
is not an attribute co-extenalve wlth being. 
The Sootl.tio and Lelbnlalan argament for the compati-
billty or oompossibilit,. ot all pure pertections is more dittloul1 
to evaluate. Apparently, this argument holds that we .0 have 
knowledge ot pertections existing in this limited world that we 
can abstraot the perfections t:rom their limited exiatence. For 
example. we can have knowledge ot the pertection ot intelleotual 
knowledge. We know that sense knowledge cannot be a pure pertec-
tion, one which oan exist unlimited, because aena. knowledp 1. 
bound up with the.ooncrete, singular, material world. We know 
that manl. intelleotual lmowledSe baa the imperfeotion ot go1ng 
trom potency to aot. However when man Is intellect 1s in act and 
knows the easenoe ot 8ometh1ng, we know that the intellect l • aot 
i. not l1m1ted by th1s material world aa the act of Mnse know-
ledge ls limited. Atter such an anal,.sia ot a pure perteotlon &ftC 
attero haYing proYen that God exists and that pure perfections .u81 
be predicated ot God, we then make an analogous predlcatlon that 
God i. knowledge In the most perteot way_ What the Sootistic and 
Lelbniaian argument wanta to do, however, is simply to argue troM 
the compossibility of all pure perteotion. with themselv •• and 
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with infinity that God i. pos.ible. 
We may us. Scotus l d1.tinction ot logioal and ~eal po.si-
bility and evaluate the proot ot the compatIbllity of the pure per-
tections .s establishing only 10gioal possibility. However aoo~. 
atll1 thinks such an argument gIves & possibility :from which eu.t. 
enoe can b. interred. We can makeu closer analysis of the argu-
ment. Sootu. I argument that the pure pertections are mutually 00 ... 
patlble d~enda upon hi. deflnl tlon of a pure perteotion as that 
wh1ch Is sImply and absolutely better than an1tb1ng inoompatible 
wi th it. It two pure pertections were mutuall,. incompatible, then 
each would bave to be greater than the other and le.8 than the o~ 
er. To avoid that contradiotion, 800tus holds that the pure per-
teotions ax-e oompatible. The argwtlOllt i. valid, but the truth ot 
the oono1usion depends upon the truth of the definition ot a pu.e 
perfection. Must we aooept the definition ot a pure pertection? 
It appears that we do not bavf!' to accept that the definit10n i. 
true, tha t 1., that t thl definltion baa an objective correlate 1n 
the existent world. 'or tne only perfections we know are perte .. 
t10ns whioh are limited, conditioned. How do we know that the ab-
stracted definition of a pure perfection has an objective reterenoe 
until we have prov~n that such a pure per-tection aotually e%1lt.? 
SoOtU8 'WOuld object that we onl:r have to prove that the definition 
ot a pure perfection 1. derived from the real world and that 1t 1. 
wi thout oontradiction. The non-contradiction shows p08s1b11i ty, 
and existenoe would be interred tro. possibility. Howver in l."e-
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sponae to the objeotion of Sootus. we can otfer this distinotion. 
If there exlstean omnipotent God, and it omnipotence consists In 
the power to px-oduce whatever doe. net involve an Intex-nal oontra-
die tlon, then the ab senoe ot internal centrad! otion in the defini-
tion ot a pure p«rteotion do~s prove that the pure perteotlon 1. 
possible .S BUehl- Bu t it .... e dO' no t presuppose the existenoe ot 
divine omn1.potenoe, then the absenoe or internal oontradiotion in 
the de~lnl tion of a. pl.ll'e p@rt'"ec,t1on prov •• no more than the coher-
ence ot an Objeot of thought. 9 
There i. aDOtheI- weakness 1n both, $ootul' and Leibn1z'. 
proofl that a pure pertection 1s compatible wi tb Inflni tJ. The 
Intinite i. detiDed negat1vely, by rererenoe to fin1te being. We 
have no proper concept of the essence ot' vha t would be flotu.),l,. 1n .. 
tin! te. With ow- conoept ot intin1 t1 "e oould anl,. suesa as to the 
possi b111 ty ot the Intlnl te b&lng. or as to the posslblli ty ot the 
pure pertection, intinite knowledge. 
b) Scotua and Lelbniz try to p:rove God·. pos.IbIllty by 
rete~lng to contingent being. The .. arguments a%'ed1tt1oul~ to 
evaluate. 
The persuasive argument ot Saotus trom the activIty ot 
the intellect and will doe. not appear to be tallaclous. Por h. 
arguea that the intellect .eeks more Intel11g1bl11t,. than 1"in!t. 
9 Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Inaisht, lew York, 1961, 611. 
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being giYes and that the will seeks more good than tinite being 
oan give. 8'1 saying that the intellect seeks to understand more 
than tinite beings, Sootus may mean that a tinite, caused being 1. 
not intelligible ot Itailt but requires its oorrelative, an un-
cau.ed caua., which makes tt. cau.ed being intelligible. Hove ... e.-
we do not think that Sootus mean. that; rather Sootua aeans that 
the Intelleot and will arte seeking their ends in infinite t:ruth 
and goodness. But it ScotU8 means that the intelleot and will hay. 
a natur-al. d •• ire tor the intin1te trtuth and good, there se ... to 
be an inoonsiatenoy in his. thought, slnoe the desire to 11 •• tOl'-
ev .. is slJ1l11ar to the desire tor the int1.n1 te good. Per Sootua 
argue. that an argument trom naturtal d.sire begs the question: 
It the argument i. based on the notion ot natural de.ir'e take! 
in an exaot and proper .enae, and a natural deslre in this 
.ens. i. not an eliolted act but merely an inolination ot na-
ture towards something, then it i8 cleal" tha t the existenc. oj 
suOb a natural. desire tort anything can be proyed only it v. 
pro .. tirst that the nature 1n quea tion i. able to haYe auch 
a thing. To argue the other vay round, theretore, is begging 
the question. Or it natural desire ia taken in a lea. proper 
senae, .iz. as an aot elioited in contormity with the natural 
inolination, we are .till unable to proye that any 811cited 
dellre il natural in thl. senae V1tbout :first pl"Ovlng the 
existenoe of a natural desire in the proper .ense ot the 
term. 10 
W. would tirst have to P1'Oft according to Sootul that the 1ntlnit. 
being exists and is 1'elated to man as the ultimate tlnal cause. 
Then he says that we know that mants desl1'. top th. infinite good 
10 itamis!!y!!!' Sootl.. 0Eera Omnia, ed. Vi" •• , Lib. IV 
Sententiarum, III, q. 2, If, 63b. . ---
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is a natural desire. So Sootus thinks th*t every argument based 
on natural desire is inoonolusive. We do not see how we oan reoon 
cile the proot ot the co.possibility ot infinity and being with t 
rejection ot any proot ot immortality rro. natural de.ire. There 
doe. not aee. to be any point in oalling the proot persuasive ot 
compossihility and also inoonolusive ot oomposaibility. 
Scotus otfers another persuasive argument: an analogy 
that it infinity is possible In quantity, then Infinity i. 
in being and etfio1ent oausal1ty. The analogy seems weak. 
tinity in the division ot quantity i. never actual, but only poten 
iial. However, Sootu. ass.rts 1n the analogy that just .. s intin1 
is not opposed to quantity potentially, so neither is in!1nity op-
posed to being and etricient oausality in an ac tual way. Because 
it is possible, that 18, not oontradiotory, to have an aotually in 
tinite number ot etteota realised successively, tor example, in an 
eternal motion, Sooius can oonclude that the infinite cause ot 
the .. etteots is possible. Now it there exists an omnipotent God_ 
and it omnipotence consists in the power to produoe whatever doe. 
not involve an internal contradictIon, then the absenoe ot interna 
contradiction in the idea ot an infinite number ot suocessive et-
tects does prove that ihe infinity in ettects i. po.sible. There-
tore Scotus oan oonclude that tbe proper cause of these ettect. i. 
po.sible. But it we do not presuppose the existenoe ot divine om-
nipotenoe, then the ab.enoe ot internal oontradiotion in the'ide. 
ot an intinity in succe.sive etrects pro.e. no more than the cober 
11 
enoe ot an objeot of thought. Therefore the real possibility ot 
God is not establIShed. 
The argument ot Scotus tor the first possible erticient 
oause appears to be valid. The rea.on tbat Sootus pl'Ove. the pos-
.ibillty of the Fir.t Nature is that Soctus starts with the po •• l-
bl1lty ot something being cau.ed. Scotua doe. so in ord«r to have 
a neo •• sary pre~ •• about an es.enoo or pos.ible which doe. not 
consider the essence .s contingently existing. Scotus believes 
that it is nece.aary that a man 1. pOlsible beoause there is no 
contradiction in the quiddity ot man, that it is necesaary that a 
man 1. pOllible because the possible being bas its possibility 
trom Its own quiddity. We have to disagree with this reason ot 
Sootus. For It we do not presuppose tlw existence of' divine omni-
potence, then the absence ot internal contradic tlon in the quiddi-
ty of man proves no mON than tbe coherence ot an obJ_ct ot though~ i"-
It is only necessary that man can be 1t God existl. However, we 
are able to know another way that it 18 necessarY' that a man can 
be. It we know that a man exists, then while we know thi., it is 
neoe •• arily true that a man exist.. SimilarlY'. while we know that 
this man extsts, it il necessarily true tbat this man is able to 
exist, i.e., that he is po.sible. Sootus could have round a nec-
essary premise about a contingent existent, but be did not rind 
such a premia.. ne thought he had round a necessary premil. about 
the po.sibllitY' or someth1ng being caused, but hi. pre.upposltiolUl 
tor necessity were weak. Howev .. we have found a way to support 
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his premise that it i. neoessarily true that something i8 po.slble. 
Pep while we know that a man exists or that something is being 
oaused, it Is neoessarily true that something oan be oau.-d. Tbus 
we may start with the apprehension or real possibility without be. 
sinning with the exiatent a. exiatent. Therefore, because ot the 
impossibility and unintelligibility ot an infinity ot essentlally 
ordered cau~el, the rea.l possibility ot something being oaused re-
quires the real possibility ot the first uncauaable efficient 
cause. Theretore we can demonstrate the possibility ot God. 
Leibnls". proof ot the possibility ot the Necessary Be. 
ing appears to be tallacious. Pol" be argue.: 
It the neoe.sary being i. impossible, all oontlngent beings 
would be impossible. 
But some contingent belng is possible. 
Theretore the necessary being is possible. 
The _jor premise 1. evident only by proving that the actual exist. 
enoe ot oontingent beinga d.pends upon the existenoe of the Neces-
.ary aeing. The weakness ot the argument Is that the aotual exi.t. 
ence ot God i. implied in the _ jor; theretore, ot course, the con .. 
clusion tollows that God i. possible. And so the conolusion prove. 
le •• than the major premis. Assumes for its proof in LeIbnlz'a 
tru. tment. There is another weakness to the argument. 'l'h1s weak-
ness ls Le1bniz la notion of oontingenoy. He hold.s that an ex1a'en1 
limited being i. oontingent because his knowledge tinds no oontra-
diotion in the ter.ns in predloating non-existenoe ot a l1mIted .a-
.ence. Lelbniz makes contingenoy more a fac t ot my knowledge ot 
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being; the question corJld very well be asked whether or not beings 
must correspond to my knowledge. 
Leibn1s's proof ot that conditional syllogism is talla-
clous. But his 81110g1s. can be proven bJ Scotus without tallacy. 
'or the mino~ premise that lome contingent being ls possible can 
be known !'rom aotual experience ot 80me exiatent being which per-
lshes, but not trom an analysia of the concept of a being. ':Chen 
we would know tha t some con~ingent being was po.sible. Now it 
would be a ~equlsite oondition ot the real possibIlity of aame oon. 
tingent being that aome n.cessarr being be really possible. POI" 
it aomethillg oan be caused, something must be able to cause that 
being; and beoause of the impossibility 01' an infinite serie. ot 
essentially ord~r.d oauses, 80Me first cause must be possible. 
That .18 what the major premise 01' Leibniz can assert 1n terms ot 
impossibility: it the necessary being i. impossible, the contin-
gent being is possible. The ayllog1s. ot te1bn1z can be understooj 
a. aimply casting Scotus' argument into a conditional sylloSis •• 
We have examined and evaluated the arguments ot ScotWi 
am L.1bniz ror the possibi11 t1 of God. A key point in their argu-
ments is the distinct10n between the real or possible being and 
existent being. Scotus d1stingUish •• between 10g1cal poasibl1it7 
and reAl po.sibility. but Leibnis holds th ••• tl«) possibilities 
are 01' .qual strength In an argument. But Scotus doea not attrib-
ute eq,ual .trength and holds that an argument trom the really pos-
sIble as known from an existent can demonstrate the real po.albil. 
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ity or God. Be holds the arguments from logical posslbility to be 
only persuasive and the argument trom the activity ot the 1ntelleo 
and will as seeking the infinite good as persuasive. The stronses 
argument w. bay. acoepted tor God's possibility Is our Interpreta-
tion ot Sootus t proof trom efficiency_ We will now discWls and e-
valuate the arguments establisbina God's existence from Bis possi-
bility. 
2) Interence.!£gm ~ Possibility 9..!. ~.i9. m.. Aotual Existence 
Scot us argue. tram the possibility ot the firat unoausa-
ble etfioient cause to It. actual existence, an4 be argues trom 
the compossibility of intinity and being that the infinite being 
actually exists. Wi th regard to the first ertioient cause, he ar-
gues tbat anything, to whose nature It is contrad1otory to reoeive 
ex1stence from something else, exists of 1tselt, it 1t is able to 
exist at all. Since it ls contradictory tor the tirst uncausable 
efficient cause to be caused by receiving existence trom another, 
the flrst possible efficlent cause must exlst ot itselt since it 
was proven to be a real possible which guarantees the real possi-
bility ot something being able to be caused. With regard to the 
campo.sible intinlte being, Scotus has two arguments. First, he 
argues that it is contradiotory to the notlon ot 1nfinite being 
that it be oaused by another to exist. Theretore, the oompossible 
infln1te belng mu.t have aotual existenoe in order to preserve its 
status aa a posaible. Sootus' seoond argument is that it the inti 
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nite being did not actually exist, It would not be able to be In-
tuited, but then its non-exlstenc. would contradiot tbe eas.ntial 
reality 01' the possible which ought to be able to be intuite4. 
Sinoe the possible reality 01' the infinite being oannot be contra-
dicted, the in.t"in1te being must actually exist. 
In making the transltion from posslbl1ity to aotual 
exlstenoe, Sootus remarka that to oonoeive a thing as exlsting 
do •• not mean that that tblne 1. ooncelved to .. greater .xtent. 
But beoauae .. po.alble whicb do ••• xl.t ls greater than anything 
el .. whloh 1. solely in the Int.lleot, what .xlats in reallty ls 
conceivably greater tban what _xlst. only In the Intellect. 
Leibn1z also argues that it God, the being poasessing 
all pertections, i. po •• lble, He must exist. For exiatenoe Is a 
perteotlon; hence the beIng po •••• slng all pertections, who •• pos. 
albl1ity was established in the ~ priori proot ot the oompatib1li. 
ty ot all pure perfectiona, must posseaa the perrection 01' exl.t-
enoe. Lelbniz'. basio criterion tor judging lotlether or not exl.t-
ence 1s a pex-t'eotlon i. that existeno. 1. a perteotlon 11' it in-
oreases the reality 01' the thing oonoeived. Bow he atflrms that a 
thing ooncei ved as exlstlng baa IIOre reall t7 than the same thins 
oonoeived as possible. 
In tbe demonstration trom oontingenoy whicb 11 to Ibow 
tbe po.albl11t,. ot' the neoe.sary being, It 1& erldent to Leibn.1z 
tbat the po •• lb111t7 or es.enc. ot the necessary being .eana that 
1 t i . necessai-I1,. does exl at of 1 t"elf • 
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'.the prin01ple that \ore will use to evaluate the argument. 
tor the existenoe of God 1s that His exis tenoe oan be known onl,. 
in oonneotion wi th _n's intelleotual and sensible knowledge of 
the exlstent world. There tore , the only valid argu.m.en.t is Scotu. t 
demonstration of the possibilit, and actuallty or the tirst effl-
clent cause. For he started w1 th the real possibility of some-
thing being oaus.d .s experienoed trom the changeable, GAuaabl. 
existent world. All the oth4tr arguments are inval1d ainoe the,. 
assume pos~lbilit1 becau •• 1~osslbillt1 1s not evident. Suoh 
po •• ibility is onlv logioal and proves 01'111 the coherenoe of an ob 
jeot or thought. No exlstenoe oan be interred trom 10gloal po •• i-
billty_ 
The~. ls o~e objeotion vh1cb might be raised against our 
position. The obj.ctor would sal·that, once the world ot exlstano 
ls lett and we enter the realm of the possible (e •• eno.s whioh can 
be), we must remaln in the po •• lble world. Our answer i ... dis-
tinction. it we enter the world of logical po.sibility, then ve 
oannot Inter existenoe: but it we know real po.sibillty through 
our experience of wbat actually i8, then we can int.r the exist-
ence of that whioh nece •• arily guarant ••• that real pos.ibillty_ 
It the objeotor 8&Y'. that 1' •• 1 pos.ibility .eaDa nothIng, then we 
mu..t SimplY' diaagr.e. It is _anlngtul and it .. ana aore than 
simply the abaeno. ot internal contradiotion to -'1 that the .xist 
ent world 1a posaible, since it do •• actually extst. What aotual-
11 ia, can b.. Th ••••• no. whicb exi.ta ia an •••• no. which can 
8,3 
be. 
w. wish to make clear that our emph.a..'3is on the reality 
ot possibillty or e,senee doe. not mean that we tr$at existence .a 
a oonsequenoe of essenoe. Wo agree vith Sootu. that a possible 
which exists is greater than anything el.o which i. solely in th. 
intell.ct. And we agree with Leibniz tha. t the existent thing has 
t'110l"'e reality than the same thing conoeived as onl,. possible. We 
art.!" not sa,.ing that existenoe i. to be conce! ved. Existence in 
this world is known by the judgment intellectuall" not as a con-
cept. It might seem that we treat existence as a consequent ot 
e •• enoe when we infer that God ex18ts because we know His po •• lbil 
ity. W. are not laying that Hi. existenoe tlow. from Hi. e •• enoe. 
Rather we are saying that the only way that God oan be really po.-
sIble 1s that He nec.ssaril,. exists ot Himse1t. Hi. essenoe is 
His existence. 
W. have accomplished our task ot describing, comparing, 
and .... luat1na the attitud~ ot Dun. SootWJ and Leibnlz tovard the 
ontological argument. ~lg1nall1, the thesia waa planned to be 
only a desoription and comparison, howeveF. the opportunity bas 
b.en taken to discuss the philosophical problaa which Scotua and 
Leibniz have raisedl "Elan we know the possibility pt God? And 
it" so, can we in..fer His eXistence trom His possibilltTl" In their 
ontological arguments, Scotus and Lelbn1z are aware that they are 
arguing from the oonoept of God to the exlstenoe ot God. They 
ha .. oaretull,. tried to Juatlfy the reality ot the ooncept o~God 
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and the validity of the inf.~.no. trom poasibillty to aotual exl., 
enoe. The a~guments most d1f'tloult to rejeot wre: the argument 
of' Sootua tor the real oompoasibllity of' all pure perteot19na, and 
the argument tram the strivIng of the will for the Infinite Good. 
The onlT argument whlch we have aooepted as provIng God'. po.slbil 
1t1 is Scotu.a' .! Rosteriod demonstratlon from. etrl01.noy. 
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